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The AIFM EU directive and its 
impact on private equity and 
venture capital
AIFM has passed the EU parliament
After a lengthy process which started in 
2006 and culminated in the highly-debated 
Rasmussen  report,  the  EU  parliament 
finally approved new regulatory rules for 
Alternative  Investment  Fund  Managers 
(AIFM), making a wide range of alternative 
investment  funds  subject  to  EU-wide 
supervision  and  regulation  for  the  first 
time. The new rules are applicable to hedge 
funds, private equity and venture capital 
funds, commodity funds, real estate funds 
and infrastructure funds, and also closed-
end funds, which do not form part of the 
UCITS directive. Assets worth considera-
bly more than 1 trillion euros are affected. 
Hence, it can be considered as one of the 
broadest financial regulative initiatives in 
EU history that needs to be transformed 
into national laws in the coming two years. 
As compared to the initial proposals the 
final regulatory framework has definitively 
been weakened.
The main objective of the AIFM directive 
is  to  manage  and  reduce  risks  that  are 
caused by AIFM activities and have the 
potential to “spread or amplify throughout 
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the financial system”. The new regulative 
initiative  also  pursues  certain  investor 
protection  aims,  such  as  increasing 
transparency  and  avoiding  fraud.  In 
order to achieve these objectives, AIFMs 
must  disclose  information  defined  in 
the  directive  and  comply  with  capital 
requirement  rules,  limitations  on 
remuneration and on financing practices 
(especially  with  regard  to  leverage), 
tighter rules on “asset stripping” as well 
as  depository  requirements.  In  return, 
AIFMs can apply for registration in the 
entire  European  Union  rather  than  on 
a country-by-country basis. Registration 
for  such  an  “EU  passport”  implies  the 
acceptance of the entire set of rules of the 
AIFM directive (this applies to EU based 
AIFMs as well as to non-EU based AIFMs 
aiming to operate in the EU). 
One Framework – Many Targets
While there is very little argument against 
the stated objective to address and limit 
systemic risks that are potentially initiated 
by AIFMs, there are significant concerns 
about the broad scope of the directive. The 
“one size fits all” approach comes at a high 
cost, likely even amplified by the translation 
of  the  directive  into  national  law. This 
becomes  obvious  when  considering  the 
deterrent effects of the directive on the 
private equity segment and in particular on 
the venture capital industry.
This concern comes not least against the 
background of a large body of academic 
research  (including  research  at  CFS) 
that  shows  that  leveraged  buyouts  and 
venture capital are vital components of the 
European industrial and financial landscape 
for securing future innovation, growth and 
competitiveness. 
There  are  at  least  four  points  worth 
stressing.  First,  neither  in  the  particular 
event  of  the  recent  financial  crisis  nor 
in  general  considerations,  private  equity 
(PE)  funds  or  venture  capitalists  (VCs) 
are  considered  to  cause  systemic  risk. 
Even if there were concerns that excessive 
leverage  in  portfolio  companies  might 
cause  spill-over  effects  to  the  banking 
system (for which we have no empirical 
evidence at all), capital ratios rather than 
limits  on  leverage  are  the  right  policy 
instrument. In this sense, the application of 
the new rules to the PE and VC industry is 
not in line with the main objective of the 
directive.  Even  the  objective  of  investor 
protection seems to be questionable in this 
context, given the fact that investors in PE 
and VC  funds  are  institutional  investors 
and thus sophisticated market players, who 
do  not  need  government  protection  via 
regulation.
While  there  are  possibilities  for  small 
venture capital funds to “opt out” of the 
regulation, this is only feasible at a 0-1 basis. 
Opting-out implies to forego access to the 
EU  passport,  a  significant  disadvantage 
in  the  fund-raising  process.  In  addition, 
since opting-out might be considered as 
a negative signal by investors, this might 
force venture capitalists to obey the rules 
of the AIFM directive.
Second, the regulation is highly distortive. 
While  it  imposes  significant  costs  on 
AIFMs when financing small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), the same is not true 
for strategic investors. This distortion on 
the basis of ownership is questionable and, 
given the lack of managerial expertise and 
improvements  in  corporate  governance, 
inefficient (many academic papers clearly 
stress the value-added function of VCs and 
PEs in this respect). In addition, it puts EU 
based AIFMs at a disadvantage when they 
compete for business outside the EU, not 
least due to the fact that U.S. regulation 
is far less restrictive. This has long-term 
effects  hindering  the  establishment 
of  EU  based  cross-border  investments. 
Furthermore, since it makes investments 
in European small and medium enterprises 
less attractive for non-EU AIFMs, it reduces 
the supply of urgently needed risk capital 
to SMEs in Europe.
Third,  the  AIFM  directive  contradicts 
in  its  implications  with  other  important 
policy initiatives. A substantial number of 
policy  initiatives,  either  at  the  EU  level 
or at a national level, aim to strengthen 
SME financing in general and VC and PE 
financing in particular (e.g. the ERP co-
venturing program of KfW in Germany). 
In  this  sense,  we  consider  the  AIFM 
directive with its significant (administrative 
and  capital)  costs  on  PE/VC  investors 
as  being  inconsistent  with  such  policy 
initiatives. 
Fourth,  many  concepts  stated  in  the 
directive are rather vague and subject to 
interpretation across EU member states, 
thus opening up potential for regulatory 
arbitrage. This is true, for example, for the 
specific  constraints  on  remuneration  of 
AIFMs as well as for the disclosure rules, 
such as the precise rules for the valuation 
of  assets  and  the  calculation  of  the  net 
asset value. It is even more eminent for the 
specific treatment of leverage at the fund 
level or the portfolio firm level.
Translation into national law ...
What  are  the  implications  at  this  stage? 
Obviously  still  quite  a  lot  depends  on 
the  way  the  EU  directive  is  transposed 
into national law, not least due to the fact 
that  some  of  the  vague  concepts  from 
the  directive  leave  significant  leeway  for 
interpretation. Given the costs associated 
with the directive and the obvious conflicts 
with other policies, especially with respect 
to SMEs, national policy makers should be 
very careful in designing too strict national 
laws or even taking the chance to introduce 
even  tougher  rules.  The  underlying 
principle should be to limit systemic risks 
rooted in the actions of AIFMs in financial 
markets while aiming to keep the indirect 
costs as low as possible. 
Uwe  Walz, CFS Director
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This White Paper is a discussion paper 
written by Jan Pieter Krahnen (CFS) and 
Helmut Siekmann (Goethe University) 
on the government draft of the recently 
adopted Bank Restructuring Act.
In  short,  one  of  the  most  common 
insights gained from the financial crisis 
is  that  systemic  risk  (i.e.  risk  that 
endangers  system-relevant  banks  and 
thus in turn endangers the stability of 
the financial system) is an externality, 
which is not properly considered in the 
decision  making  of  bankers.  Systemic 
risk could be induced by different factors: 
portfolio  correlation  (influenced  by 
similar portfolio structures), interbank 
connections  (bilateral  relations) 
and  indirect  interbank  connections 
(influenced by market illiquidity, price 
decrease).  Each  financial  institute 
contributes with its investment policy to 
the potential systemic risk of the whole 
financial system.
The newly proposed Bank Restructur-
ing Act includes a Bank Reorganisation 
Act  (Gesetz  zur  Reorganisation  von 
Kreditinstituten  –  “KredReorgG”), 
which has as primary goal the proper 
internalization  of  systemic  risk  and  a 
“bail-in”  (as  opposed  to  a  bail-out) 
for  bank  equity  and  debt  holders.  It 
also  introduces  a  Restructuring  Fund 
(Restrukturierungsfonds).
The Bank Reorganisation Act foresees 
in voluntary and unvoluntary measures: 
a (voluntary) restructuring proceeding 
(Sanierungsverfahren) with the appoint-
ment of an advisor (Sanierungsberater) 
to  implement  a  restructuring  plan, 
and  a  (partially  involuntary)  measure 
consisting of a reorganization proceeding 
(Reorganisationsverfahren)  and  a 
transfer of parts of a bank’s liabilities 
to a bridge bank if the existence of the 
bank and the stability of the financial 
system are endangered.
According to the authors, the main con-
tribution of the Bank Reorganisation 
Act  lies  in  the  involuntary  part  of 
the  proceedings.  The  effectiveness 
depends on the ability to restructure 
a bank by separating the systemically 
relevant parts. If a financial institution 
is unable or unwilling to restructure, 
authorities have the power to transfer 
the  systemically  relevant  parts  of  a 
troubled  financial  institution  to 
a  bridge  bank  –  Good  Bank.  The 
creditors and owners of the remaining 
“old  bank”  will  carry  responsibility 
for  the  remaining  parts.  The  aim  of 
this proceeding is twofold, namely to 
protect the systemically relevant parts 
of a bank so that other institutions are 
not  affected,  and  to  have  a  credible 
method to leave the remaining parts 
of  a  troubled  bank  unprotected  in 
order  to  minimize  the  burden  for 
the  tax  payer  and  to  reduce  moral 
hazard.  The  authors  see  a  need  for 
international  harmonization  of  such 
regulation, certainly when “large and 
complex  financial  institutions 
(LCFI)” are involved. 
The  authors’  main  point  of  critique 
is  that  the  intention  of  the  Act  can 
be  undermined,  when,  prior  to  a 
crisis,  bank  liabilities  are  acquired  by 
other  banks  in  order  to  make  them 
systemically relevant. A solution could 
be to keep a certain minimum of bank 
liabilities  permanently  held  outside 
the  core  financial  sector.  To  achieve 
this,  investment  rules  for  institutional 
investors (pension funds and insurance 
companies)  and  banks  need  to  be 
adjusted.
Finally,  the  authors  criticize  the 
method used to fix the levy that credit 
institutions are obliged to pay into the 
restructuring  fund.  Three  criteria  are 
currently  used:  business  volume,  size 
and  interbank  connectivity.  However, 
the charge should be oriented towards 
factors that narrow down the systemic 
risk contribution of an institution. The 
overall limit of € 100 billion for the fund 
is also considered not justifiable.
                  CFS White Papers
CFS White Paper No. V
Stellungnahme zum Restrukturierungsgesetz
Comment on the “Bank Restructuring Act”
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    CFS White Papers are available 
for download on the CFS 
website www.ifk-cfs.de/
index.php?id=15634
This is the fifth G-20 preparatory report 
written by the Issing Commission. In this 
paper, the Commission outlines four key 
policy  measures  necessary  to  achieve  a 
more resilient and stable financial system: 
1) de-risking individual financial institutions 
(by increasing capital requirements under 
Basel III); 
2) imposing bail-in (as opposed to bail-out) 
for debt and equity holders; 
3) de-risking the financial system by limiting 
the  extent  of  systemic  risk  (creating  a 
systemic  risk  charge  together  with  an 
oversight body);
4)  de-risking  the  trading  of  securities 
and  derivatives,  by  requiring  financial 
institutions  to  use  central  counterparties 
(CCP) in these markets.
While  progress  on  all  four  accounts  has 
been impressive, the authors see a need for 
further actions: 
1) Concerning the de-risking of individual 
financial  institutions,  the  authors 
emphasize the need to implement Basel III 
synchronously in all major jurisdictions. 
2) As to bail-in procedures, legislation efforts 
are now underway in many countries. The 
authors  propose  two  activities  in  order 
to have cross-border coordination of such 
bail-in activities. The first coordination issue 
relates  to  an  international,  legal  overlay 
preparing  the  ground  for  cross-border 
financial failures; the second issue concerns 
the necessity of a regulation on “defaultable” 
bank debt. A certain fraction of each bank’s 
debt needs to remain truly defaultable, that 
is, some bank debt (bonds in particular) has 
to be permanently held outside the core 
financial sector, by holders not subject to 
any deposit insurance scheme. 
3) In order to de-risk the financial system, 
the  authors  advocate  an  effective  policy 
towards  systemic  risk  containment:  a 
comprehensive  data  sharing  arrangement 
needs to be agreed between jurisdictions, 
and a formal mandate has to be given to some 
agency in order to progress towards data 
consolidation and 
systemic risk assessment. 
4) Further recommendations of the Com-
mission concern the trading of securities 
and derivatives.  Regulatory efforts should 
be made to require all derivatives to be 
cleared (or at least reported) via central 
clearing institutions, of which there should 
exist but a very few. 
The report also responds to the proposal for 
a Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), which 
addresses the important issue of liquidity 
reserves and self-insurance against external 
shocks. Some aspects of the proposal need 
to be critically assessed. The accumulation 
of  currency  reserves  is  seen  to  a  large 
extent as a by-product of the exchange rate 
policy, not as the result of self-insurance. 
An institutionalized scheme for additional 
liquidity provisioning may enhance moral 
hazard  and  has  other  shortcomings. The 
authors  argue  that  alternative  sources  of 
liquidity, like the provision of trade finance, 
would appear more favorable.
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2010/14      Price Pressures
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2010/15      Trade-throughs in European Cross-traded Equities After 
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2010/16      Economic Literacy: An International Comparison
  Tullio Jappelli
2010/17      Pre-Averaging Based Estimation of Quadratic Variation in the 
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2010/18      Measuring Confidence and Uncertainty during the Financial 
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    Horst Entorf, Christian Knoll, Liliya Sattarova
2010/19      Capturing the Zero: A New Class of Zero-Augmented 
Distributions and Multiplicative Error Processes
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2010/20      Cash Flow and Discount Rate Risk in Up and Down Markets: 
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2010/21      Optimal Life Cycle Portfolio Choice with Housing Market 
Cycles
    Marcel Marekwica and Michael Stamos
2010/22      Vertical Integration, Compe-tition, and Financial Exchanges: 
Is there Grain in the Silo?
  Steffen Juranek and Uwe Walz
2010/23      Why do investors sell losers? How adaptation to losses affects 
future capitulation decisions
    Carmen Lee, Roman Kraeussl, André Lucas, Leo Paas
2010/24      Risk Aversion under Preference Uncertainty
    Roman Kraeussl, André Lucas, Arjen Siegmann
2010/25  Exit Strategies
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2010/26    Credit Risk Transfers and the Macroeconomy Ester Faia
The following CFS Working Papers appeared in the second half of 2010 and can be downloaded from our website www.ifk-cfs.de:
CFS Working Papers 
CFS White Paper No. VI
Recommendations by the Issing Commission 
Memo for the G-20 November 2010 summit in Seoul
By Otmar Issing (Chairman), Jan Pieter Krahnen, Klaus Regling, and William White
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CFS Financial Center Index Survey Paper presented in New York 
Based on CFS’ quarterly survey, the paper 
“Measuring Confidence and Uncertainty 
during  the  Financial  Crisis:  Evidence 
from the CFS Survey” by Horst Entorf, 
Liliya Sattarova and Christian Knoll was 
accepted  for  presentation  at  the  30th 
CIRET  Conference  organized  by  the 
Centre for International Research on Eco-
nomic Tendency Surveys. The conference 
that took place in New York on 15 October 
had as special topic: “Economic Tendency 
Surveys and Financial Markets”. 
CIRET  attracts  economic  research 
focused  on  tendency  surveys  and  has 
an  international  reputation  for  its 
specialization  in  cyclical  indicator 
analysis.  With  approximately  175  par-
ticipants  from  35  countries  and  115 
presented papers, the conference evolved 
to a marketplace for discussion of new 
methodological  developments  and  their 
results in the field. Horst Entorf chaired 
the  session,  Liliya  Sattarova  discussed 
financial literacy in Russia, and Christian 
Knoll presented the paper, making this 
the  first  appearance  of  CFS  academic 
research on the CIRET platform. 
Furthermore, CIRET distributed the Isaac 
Kerstenetzky Award1 and CFS is proud to 
announce that the paper received the 2010 
Award  with  an  Honorable  Mention  for 
introducing new measures of uncertainty 
in financial markets. 
Introducing new concepts for 
measuring uncertainty  
A high degree of uncertainty about the 
current and future situation of the banking 
system and its inherent systemic risk is 
considered to be one of the main reasons 
for the recent financial crisis. The paper 
addresses this crucial topic and attempts 
to measure uncertainty in order to better 
understand the reasons driving the recent 
turmoil  and  improve  the  forecasting 
of  future  recessions.  More  precisely, 
the  paper’s  main  contribution  lies  in 
covering  individual  business  situations 
and measuring the uncertainty of banks 
and other companies and institutions of 
the financial sector during the crisis.
Compared  to  the  well-established  Ifo 
(Munich) and ZEW (Mannheim) surveys 
of  Germany’s  economic  prospects,  the 
CFS  Survey  has  an  innovative  feature 
with its focus on the individual situation 
of firms within the financial sector and 
not  on  the  economy  as  a  whole.  This 
provides a unique possibility to analyze 
valuations,  expectations  and  forecast 
errors of the core sector of the crisis.
Using standard methods of aggregating 
individual survey data, the paper first 
presents the CFS survey by comparing 
CFS  indicators  of  confidence  and 
predicted confidence to Ifo and ZEW 
indicators.2  The  major  methodological 
contribution of the paper is the analysis 
of several indicators of uncertainty. In 
addition  to  well  established  concepts 
(e. g. volatility of confidence or forecast 
errors),  the  authors  introduce  new 
measures based on i) the skewness of 
forecast errors and ii) the share of ‘no 
response’ replies. The first one allows 
to  draw  some  additional  conclusions 
about  the  asymmetry  of  positive  and 
negative  surprises  that  the  financial 
sector has to face. The second measure 
could be directly interpreted as a level 
of  uncertainty  about  the  current  and 
prospective situation of a company.
The results shown in the paper confirm 
that the proposed uncertainty indicators 
fit  well  with  the  patterns  of  real  and 
financial time series of the time period 
2007  to  2010.  Moreover  the  paper 
proves that the CFS survey data, so far 
only available for a relatively short time 
period, show a promising performance 
for  its  measures  of  confidence  and 
uncertainty. Thus the future waves of 
the CFS survey may provide researchers, 
professional  financial  analysts  and 
economic  forecasters  with  some 
excellent  information  on  the  current 
and  future  situation  of  the  financial 
sector.  
WP 2010/18: “Measuring Confidence and Uncertainty 
during the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the CFS Survey”
Horst Entorf, Liliya Sattarova (both Goethe University) and Christian Knoll (CFS)
1Award in honor of Isaac Kerstenetzky, who started the first Business Tendency Survey in Latin America and donated by the FGV (Fundação Getulio Vargas) of Brazil.
2 These measures are commonly computed as the difference between the shares of positive and negative answers in the samples, and serve as the basis for evaluating the uncertainty in the economy.
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CFS Financial Center Index further on the rise
Service providers create jobs 
The  CFS  Financial  Center  Index  has 
moved up again and has reached a level 
of 112.9 points. Continuing its upward 
trend since April 2009, the index is now 
13 points below its record high of 125.7 
points that was registered in January 2007. 
The rise is reflected in both subindices 
“performance”  and  “projection”,  which 
have moved up in equal measure.
The  positive  trend  is  recorded  among 
all branch-specific groups of the survey 
(financial institutions/brokerage firms, 
financial  sector  service  providers, 
supervisory  and  academic  institutions, 
connected  enterprises)  and  across  all 
areas  of  value  creation  (transaction 
volume,  profits,  employment,  invest-
ments). A closer look at two groups of 
the survey reveals some branch specific 
differences.
Most  striking  is  the  overall  strong 
performance  of  the  financial  sector 
service providers, such as accountancy 
firms and consultancies, with an above-
average growth in transaction volume and 
profits. The group of financial institutions   
and  brokerage  firms  comparatively 
underperformed with an increase of 2.8 
points in transaction volume and a decline 
of 2.4 points in profits. Looking at the 
third  index  component,  employment, 
both  financial  institutions  and  service 
providers showed an improvement. The 
actual employment figures of the service 
providers profit from their strong overall 
performance  in  the  third  quarter. The 
financial  institutions  remain  cautiously 
optimistic,  which  is  reflected  in  a 
reluctance to start hiring new staff.
“The  results  show  that,  in  light  of  a 
strengthening economy, financial sector 
service providers have invested in new 
capacities. In contrast to this, banks have 
shown declining returns and employment 
figures, which seem to coincide with the 
regulatory reforms of Basel III”, explains 
CFS Director Jan Pieter Krahnen.
The  assessment  of  the  importance  of 
Germany as a financial center was more 
positive  than  in  the  previous  quarter, 
with an increase of 6.0 points. However, 
this  figure  has  fluctuated  considerably 
in the recent past and its trend points 
downwards  since  the  beginning  of 
2009.
Basel III earns approval
 
The special survey held this time analyzed 
the expectations concerning the impact 
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of  the  new  Basel  III  capital  standards, 
and the transition periods that will apply 
for the Basel III rules (see also page 14).
In sum, the financial sector as a whole 
very much agrees on the consequences: 
the  majority  of  the  panelists  expect 
higher levels of financial stability, credit-
tightening  effects  and  lower  returns, 
and  a  lower  risk  appetite  by  banks. 
One year ago, the same questions were 
asked to the panel and the answers today 
prove  to  be  very  similar.  In  fact,  the 
results  are,  today,  more  supportive  of 
Basel III with a clearly positive opinion 
about  the  stabilizing  effects  that  are 
expected to arise from Basel III (77% 
of  today’s  panelists  expect  stabilizing 
effects compared to 67% last year).
Most participants think that the transition 
period  of  Basel  III  is  appropriate. The 
survey  showed  no  major  discrepancies 
between  the  various  branch-specific 
groups,  although  the  share  of  those 
who  consider  the  transition  period  to 
be  appropriate  is  comparatively  higher 
among banks. 10% argue that the period 
is too short, while 10% say that it is too 
long.  The  former  consider  the  credit 
supply  being  at  peril,  while  the  latter 
still see an imminent danger arising from 
systemic risk.
The  survey  reveals  that  an  additional 
demand  for  regulatory  action  exists  in 
3  areas  (Figure  2):  bank  restructuring 
(32%),  securitization  and  regulation  of 
derivatives trading (24%) and systemic risk 
containment (23%). The surveyed groups, 
however, differ in the way they prioritize 
those areas. Banks regard systemic risk as 
the most eminent issue to be dealt with 
(33%), non-banks such as asset managers 
and  insurance  companies  rather  see  the 
highest  demand  for  regulatory  action 
within the area of derivatives/securitization 
(31%), while service providers focus on 
bank restructuring (37%) as the area in 
greatest need of action.
9 February 2011    Dr. Joachim Faber 
(Allianz Global Investors AG)
2 March 2011  Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, MdEP
8 April 2011    Charles Dallara 
(Institute of International Finance)
31 May 2011  Prof. Dr. Michael Heise (Allianz Se)
31 August 2011  Wolfgang Kirsch (DZ Bank AG)
20 September 2011    Dr. Clemens Börsig    
(Deutsche Bank AG)
9 November 2011  Klaus Regling (EFSF)
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Calender for the 2011 CFS Colloquium Series
„Staat und Finanzwirtschaft: Auf der Suche nach neuen Strukturen
Relationship Between State and Financial Markets“
CFS Colloquium
Fault Lines: 
How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy 
30 June 2010 
Prof. Raghuram G. Rajan, The University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
On 30 June 2010, Professor Raghuram Rajan, Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago, gave a 
presentation based on his book “Fault Lines - How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy” in the 
CFS Colloquium series on “Rebuilding Financial Markets”.
After being introduced by Professor Krahnen, Rajan began 
his  lecture  by  explaining  the  importance  of  understanding 
why the financial crisis of the last three years has happened. 
Finding  the  underlying  reasons  matters  because  solutions 
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based on different explanations will yield different results. 
In  particular,  just  blaming  “greedy  bankers”  and  “pliant 
regulators” is shortsighted, said Rajan, since the fundamental 
reasons  are  more  deeply  rooted.  “Bankers  were  neither 
innocent nor victims but responded to implicit and explicit 
incentives”, he said. According to Rajan, the financial sector 
in the U.S. and world economy rests on serious “fault lines”. 
Continuing this analogy to fault lines – normally a geological 
concept referring to large rifts in the earth’s crust resulting 
from tectonic forces – Rajan stated that if these economic and 
financial fault lines are not dealt with properly then the next 
crisis might not be far around the corner. He then went on to 
analyze these economic fault lines.
The first fault line he considered to be the growing inequality 
of  earnings  in  the  U.S.  and  the  political  pressure  “to  do 
something”  about  it.  Rajan  explained  that  since  the  1980s 
the  wages  of  workers  at  the  90th  percentile  of  the  wage 
distribution in the U.S. have grown much faster than the wage 
of the median worker and he attributed this development to 
the stagnant supply of well-educated people. As a consequence 
of higher demand for - and at the same time stagnating supply 
of - highly skilled workers, the wages of these workers have 
spiraled  upwards.  To  limit  the  growing  frustration  about 
rising inequalities in earnings, according to Rajan, the last 
two U.S. governments have used “easy credit policies” as a 
palliative in particular to allow greater access to consumer 
goods and housing to the lower income sector.
Rajan identified the second fault line in the export dependency 
of  some  countries  with  savings  surpluses  that  have  to  be 
absorbed  elsewhere,  in  particular  when  their  economy  is 
in recession. In countries like Germany, Japan and China, 
he  suggested  that  government  and  bank  intervention  have 
created  strong  export  firms  while  discriminating  against 
domestic households. In Rajan’s opinion this reliance on the 
export sector, whilst functioning to some extent as an overall 
growth  strategy,  left  the  domestic  market  underdeveloped 
and prone to feeble growth in normal times to the extent that 
these countries would not be able to pull themselves out of 
a recession. Instead they would have to rely on stimuli from 
other countries. Over the years, as Japan and Germany have 
become the world’s second and third largest economies, with 
China  rapidly  catching  up,  this  has  led  to  ever  increasing 
global imbalances.
The  third  fault  line  identified  by  Rajan  involved  jobless 
recoveries and an inadequate safety net in the U.S., making it 
a “reliable stimulator of first sort”. Pointing out that in the past 
in the U.S. it has taken on average two quarters for growth 
and eight months for employment to recover after a recession, 
Rajan said that the existing safety net had nonetheless sufficed 
to bridge the time of unemployment while giving at the same 
time strong incentives to search for jobs. However, with the 
recessions of 1991 and 2001, whilst it had taken between one 
and three quarters for growth to recover, employment needed 
between 23 and 38 months to revive. Effectively, sluggish job 
recoveries rendered the safety net inadequate, necessitating 
substantial support programs from the government as well as 
from the Federal Reserve. This fault line, on the one hand, 
drove the huge fiscal deficits in the U.S. and extended the 
period of extremely low interest rates and, on the other hand, 
it encouraged the exporting countries mentioned above to rely 
on stimuli from the U.S. in recessions.
Rajan then went on to analyze the relation between the outlined 
fault  lines  and  the  fact  that  low-quality  mortgage-backed 
securities  were  created,  with  banks  keeping  a  substantial 
portion of these assets on their balance sheets. According to 
Rajan, there were three major driving forces underlying this 
process, namely a) a huge amount of money that was – with 
political  support  –  channeled  into  sub  prime  lending,  b) 
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money entering the U.S. from foreign investors looking for 
high-yielding “safe” securities, and c) financially innovative 
products  that  were  made  possible  through  securitization 
responding to the demand of investors. The combination of 
these factors eliminated the checks on quality. 
Rajan asked why there was no moral backstop that prevented 
bankers  from  collecting  ever-increasing  gains  from  selling 
flawed  products.  Following  his  line  of  argument,  in  a 
sophisticated arms-length financial system the consequences 
of behavior are not felt directly. The only feedback available 
on the quality of work is the money obtained in financial 
transactions: “Making money is both a signal of personal worth 
as well as social value”. However, such a system relies strongly 
on price signals being right, whereas during the build-up of 
the crisis, a “wall of price-insensitive money” searching for 
higher returns knocked price signals enormously off-track. 
According  to  his  analysis,  however,  neither  bankers  nor 
governments are solely to blame because all agents rationally 
followed incentives given by the public and the markets. “The 
combination of incentives for high-powered performance and 
the unwillingness of governments to let failure in the financial 
system drag down ordinary citizens generates the potential for 
tail-risk taking and periodic meltdowns.”
Rajan then turned to the measures that would be required 
for dealing with the fault lines. He said that with respect 
to  financial  sector  reform,  the  focus  needs  to  be  set  on 
getting market signals and incentives right, in particular with 
regard to the roles of the central banks and governments, 
the  incentives  for  bankers  and  the  way  bondholders  price 
risk. Focusing on the U.S., Rajan suggested improving the 
access to education, and he wondered a) whether it would 
make sense to sacrifice some flexibility and innovation for 
a stronger safety net and b) whether the U.S. should not be 
more circumspect about boosting domestic consumption with 
public stimuli again. On the issue of global trade imbalances, 
he suggested that the U.S. should develop a more competitive 
export sector and that countries running a surplus should aim 
to increase productivity and competition in their domestic 
markets. However, said Rajan, most of the necessary reforms 
are of a structural nature and hence will take a long time to 
be implemented.
After the speech, Professor Krahnen thanked Professor Rajan 
for  having  presented  his  work  and  concluded  that  Rajan’s 
reform proposals sound as if the U.S. should perhaps become 
a bit more European.
Marcel Bluhm (CFS)
 Otmar Issing, Raghuram G. Rajan, Jan Pieter Krahnen
Overview of Securities Trading: 
Opportunities for Exchanges and their Customers 
8 September 2010 
Dr. Reto Francioni, CEO of Deutsche Börse AG
The next speaker at this year’s colloquium series on “Rebuilding Financial Markets” was Reto Francioni, who 
presented an overview of today’s securities trading business and the chances it entails for the stock exchanges 
and their customers. 
Jan  Krahnen  gave  a  short  welcoming  address  to  Franconi 
mentioning the enormous pressure on the exchanges resulting 
from the current movements in financial markets. He said the 
exchange sector was “juggling” in an attempt to find stability. 
The changes taking place in this sector originating from the 
financial  crisis  could  be  attributed  to  three  specific  trends. 
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The first trend concerned the significant change in traditional 
loyalties  among  financial  market  participants,  particularly 
regarding the cooperation between banks and exchanges. What 
had once been a solid business model had now been abandoned. 
Today’s competition was largely a consequence of technological 
developments, on the one hand, and the transformation of stock 
exchanges  into  independent  profit-seeking  companies  on  the 
other. In many countries, exchanges no longer served solely 
as  a  utility  for  consumers. The  second  trend  concerned  the 
regulatory changes in, for example, capital requirements and the 
subsequent need for access to capital markets, whilst the third 
trend related to supervisory changes.  Krahnen asked what these 
trends meant for the exchange industry, its regulation and its 
business models before giving the floor to Reto Francioni.
Francioni began by recounting the changing landscape, of the 
financial industry following the crisis. He said a huge “tectonic 
shift”  had  occurred  in  the  market,  with  some  participants 
disappearing and others barely surviving. A “new landscape” had 
emerged and Francioni asked what it meant for Deutsche Börse. 
The crisis during the years 2008 and 2009 has undoubtedly had a 
negative effect on the business of Deutsche Börse. Nevertheless, 
its economic basis has proven to be rock solid. In 2009, for 
example, the consolidated profit for the year amounted to 500 
million euros.
The financial crisis evoked structural changes that confronted 
Deutsche Börse as well as its customers, the banks, with new 
challenges. These new challenges, however, have also meant new 
opportunities for growth initiatives, said Francioni. Deutsche 
Börse aims to achieve its goals along the lines of an integrated 
strategy by gradually expanding to cover new products and new 
markets.
Strategic strengths, such as Deutsche Börse’s ability to ensure 
market  safety  and  integrity  and  its  neutrality,  have  gained 
in  importance  in  the  wake  of  the  crisis.  In  Franconi’s  view 
Deutsche Börse has proven to be the guardian of the interests 
of issuers and investors as well as a reliable counterparty with 
a low risk profile. This last point was illustrated well during the 
Lehman Brothers crisis two years ago, when all open positions 
of  Eurex  participants  could  be  settled  without  losses  to  the 
counterparties.  Furthermore,  the  company  has  been  able  to 
maintain its competitive position in terms of technology and 
efficiency and has the highest liquidity and the necessary critical 
mass  to  extend  its  market  share.  In  addition,  an  integrated 
business model covering the entire value chain enables the use 
of synergy effects. In Francioni’s opinion, all these strengths are 
crucial in the face of new challenges and growth opportunities.
The growth strategy of Deutsche Börse has four dimensions. The 
first one is the expansion of existing business lines. The second 
one relates to the development of new product segments like raw 
materials, energy, and OTC derivatives clearing. The exploration 
of new growth regions, with markets in Eastern Europe, Asia, 
and the Middle East, is the third strategic dimension. The fourth 
and final dimension concerns a horizontal and vertical expansion 
of activities, for example, through services in the area of risk 
management.
In comparison to its major competitors, Deutsche Börse has an 
efficient business model, and in 2009 again attained the highest 
sales revenues worldwide. Francioni stressed that his company, 
with its scalability, precision and speed-based business model, is 
well equipped to contend with the growing range of activities in 
the capital markets. Several performance figures demonstrate the 
success of Deutsche Börse: revenues including interest income, 
for example, have increased from 2004 to 2009 on average by 7% 
per annum, while costs (adjusted for the International Securities 
Exchange ISE) have remained unchanged. The trading volume 
on Xetra, the cash market of Deutsche Börse, is influenced in 
the short to medium term by economic developments and stock 
Reto Francioni, Jan Pieter Krahnen
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exchange volatility. Electronic and algorithmic trading strategies 
also exhibit a positive structural impact. Cyclical factors such 
as  inflation  and  interest  rates  expectations,  trading  volumes 
and the degree of stock market volatility play a role for trading 
activities  on  Eurex.  From  a  structural  perspective,  elements 
such as the increasing demand for European derivatives from 
traditional investment funds, the migration of OTC products 
to an organized exchange, and the substantial growth in OTC 
clearing have long-term positive effects. The business segment 
Clearstream  is  the  least  affected  by  fluctuations.  However, 
here too certain structural factors exert a positive influence: 
the preference for Eurobond emissions, the trend towards the 
international custody of securities and the increasing usage of 
secured  money  and  securities.  Francioni  concluded  that  this 
integrated business model allows Deutsche Börse to profit from 
structural trends and even to have a decisive say in them.
Francioni also spoke about the strategic priorities of Deutsche 
Börse. Concentrating on growth initiatives, operational efficiency 
and the preservation of a strong financial position are of prime 
importance to the company. This is evidenced by investments in 
growth projects worth approximately 100 million euros in 2010. 
Furthermore, the operational efficiency has improved following 
the  relocation  to  Eschborn,  since  this  has  allowed  huge  tax 
savings to be made. Furthermore, the strong financial position is 
obvious from Deutsche Börse’s rating and credit profile. 
Finally, Francioni revealed the strategic roadmap of Deutsche 
Börse for the next three years. The first target is the expansion 
on the Asian markets. Clearstream is already present in the region 
and Eurex is also active with a focus on product distribution 
and the long-term development of business relations. The next 
strategic target is the creation of new products and services, 
often jointly developed by different business segments. Next to 
its traditional business areas of trading, clearing, settlement and 
custody, Deutsche Börse also attempts to increase its services for 
risk management in and across all areas. This new core function 
has gained importance during the financial crisis and will be 
extended further, which will be to the customer’s advantage. 
Another strategic building block is the development of a new 
single trading platform. Such technical progress will contribute 
to higher speed, capacity and stability. It is intended that the new 
platform will be first implemented at ISE in New York. 
Francioni  concluded  his  speech  by  summarizing  some  of  his 
statements. Since the onset of the financial crisis the financial 
industry has been obliged to find its way in a new landscape 
with increased regulation. The objective of this regulation is to 
enhance the safety and the integrity of the markets and Deutsche 
Börse is in an excellent position to contribute to that. Ultimately, 
the company aims to create not only value but also added value 
to customers.
Simeona Staneva and Lut De Moor (CFS)
New Architecture for Financial Regulation 
22 September 2010 
Prof. Charles Goodhart, London School of Economics and Political Science
Charles Goodhart was invited by CFS to hold a lecture at this year’s colloquium series “Rebuilding Financial 
Markets“. He spoke about the newly emerging architecture of financial regulation. 
After being introduced by Uwe Walz, Goodhart began by 
stating that there is currently a lot of momentum in the field 
of  financial  regulation.  Although  some  would  argue  that 
two years after the Lehman collapse, there has still been too 
little change made to the financial architecture the evidence 
suggests that there is in fact currently a great deal happening 
in the field of financial regulation. Nowadays, more than at 
any other time, financial regulation is assuming a major role 
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worldwide. In the U.S. under the Obama administration, 
financial  regulatory  activities  have  received  the  second 
highest  priority  after  health  care  and  Congress  is  making 
rapid progress. The Dodd-Frank Act, in spite of its domestic 
focus, still leaves sufficient room for further discussions on 
many specific issues within the G20 Group. Moreover, The 
Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  has  reached  an 
agreement on new capital requirement rules, in time for the 
G20 meeting in Seoul this year. 
In the background paper for this lecture, Goodhart covers 
3 areas of concern for a new financial architecture: crisis 
prevention, improved mechanisms for crisis resolution with 
fewer economic externalities and less devastating effects on 
the tax payers, and the structural implications involved. In 
the area of crisis prevention, many new instruments are being 
devised, such as enhanced ratio controls and bank taxation. 
Also direct constraints on allowable financial practices are 
being considered. Some proposals, such as those under the 
Volcker rule, aim to prevent bank interaction with hedge 
funds or private equity funds by banning proprietary trading; 
others, such as the one put forward by the Governor of the 
Bank  of  England  Mervyn  King,  want  to  separate  “utility” 
banking from the more risky “casino” activities. A whole set 
of proposals is also dedicated to the very high remunerations 
that bankers have been earning over recent years. However, if 
a bank would try to introduce a single-handed adjustment of 
its remunerations scheme, it would be likely to lose its traders 
very quickly. The same holds true for individual countries: 
go-it-alone  policies  would  result  in  banks  departing  or 
moving  their  headquarters  from  the  country.  A  last  field 
of reform in the area of crisis prevention, pointed out by 
Goodhart in his speech, is the reform of market structures. 
He said that the lack of information and potential contagion 
that arises from over-the counter (OTC) derivatives should 
be eliminated through standardized forms of OTC trading 
and central counterparties.
Goodhart also briefly talked about the enormous structural 
implications  resulting  from  certain  new  crisis  prevention 
tools. The macro-prudential tools currently under discussion 
are instruments that will be implemented by central banks. 
Since  these  macroprudential  tools  have  microprudential 
implications,  the  question  arises  how  far  central  bankers 
should go in implementing these tools. The spectrum is very 
wide – ranging from macroprudential supervision on the one 
side to consumer protection on the other. And somewhere a 
dividing line should be drawn up for central banks, otherwise 
the concentration of responsibilities within the central banks 
would give them tremendous power and would take their 
attention away from their main area of expertise.
In the remainder of his speech, Goodhart focused on one 
aspect of crisis prevention, namely ratio controls. He started 
with a historical overview. Prior to the 1970s, the ratios that 
mattered were not based on capital but were liquidity control 
ratios. Banks went bust when they did not have enough cash; 
therefore  the  early  requirements  were  cash-requirements. 
However, these cash-ratios were easy to manipulate. When 
needed, banks could easily get access to cash, for example by 
holding readily sellable government debt or, as was the case 
in the U.K., by holding funds with (the no longer existing) 
discount houses, which took on a buffering role in order to 
get cash from the Bank of England. There were many sorts 
of liquid assets that a bank could hold and, beyond the cash-
ratios,  there  were  liquid  assets-ratios.  The  view  was  that 
central banks controlled the overall size of the banking sector 
by  controlling  the  liquidity  and  the  interest  rate.  Capital 
requirements, which basically come into play when a bank 
fails, played only a secondary role.
In the beginning of 1970s the development of the wholesale 
funding  market  represented  a  way  for  banks  to  meet  the 
growing demand for bank lending from the private sector. As 
a result, banks could massively expand their books and the 
central banks could no longer control bank size. According to 
common belief, as long as banks were adequately capitalized, 
the  wholesale  markets  would  always  be  sufficiently  large 
to  meet  liquidity  needs.  Attention  thus  shifted  to  capital 
requirements  during  the  1980s,  since  it  was  clear  that 
liquidity had ceased to constitute any form of constraint on 
the size and/or operations of a bank.
The banks, however, did not want to hold that much capital, 
using the argument that increasing financial leverage would 
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lead to a higher return on equity. Goodhart asked how this 
might square with the Modigliani-Miller theorem or capital 
structure  irrelevance  principle?  In  practice,  he  said,  the 
theorem does not work for banks. One of the reasons is the 
implicit and explicit government guarantee on all deposits 
and  virtually  all  bank  debt,  leading  to  a  situation  where 
expensive equity is not counterbalanced by a reduction in the 
cost of debt. Another reason is that wholesale markets do not 
accurately respond to differences in risk by changing relative 
prices.
The first attempt for an international regulatory framework 
came after 1982, when several American banks could have 
been bankrupt after the Latin-American debt crisis. As a 
consequence, the U.S. Congress saw the need to impose 
higher capital ratios on banks, but also realized that only 
a  concerted  international  effort  would  make  sense.  The 
result, known as Basel I, made it clear for the first time that 
banks’ risky assets should be backed by equity. However, 
the categories defined to weight the risk were too broad. 
All  private  sector  lending,  for  example,  regardless  of  its 
riskiness, was put into one category. As a result, banks sold 
off good loans to non-banks and kept bad loans on their 
books, thus, according to Goodhart, turning the banks into 
bad banks.
The  successor  to  this  first  set  of  international  banking 
regulations, Basel II, was much more risk-sensitive, but did 
not look at the risks from a time perspective. This made capital 
requirements very procyclical moving in step with boom and 
bust. Moreover, bankers found a way to circumvent Tier I 
capital requirements, by designing new hybrid instruments. 
The result was a very procyclical regulatory system where 
relatively  small  changes  in  asset  values  had  large  adverse 
effects on the banking system and the economy as a whole.
The  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  recently 
released  the  Basel  III  proposals  (see  box  on  page  14),  as 
an  improved  version  of  Basel  II.  The  new  Tier  I  capital 
requirements  are  substantially  higher  and  will  reach  an 
absolutely  satisfactory  level,  according  to  Goodhart.  A 
capital conservation and a countercyclical buffer will also be 
phased in at a later stage and could lead in boom periods to 
capital requirements for banks as large as 12%. Most nations 
wanted to raise the ratios even further but were confronted 
with  concerns  from  Germany.  The  Basel  Committee  has 
also paved the way for sanctions, previously considered to be 
highly sensitive and a country’s own decision. Sanctions, such 
as limiting the ability to pay dividends (and possibly suspend 
bonuses), could have a strong impact on the reputation of a 
non-complying institution. Goodhart, however, would have 
preferred to see a “ladder structure” for the sanctions.
 
Replying to criticism about a continuation of the procyclical 
mark-to-market accounting principle in Basel III, Goodhart 
rhetorically asked, “What do you mark to instead?” Counter-
cyclical  alternatives  are  mostly  ineffective,  because  of  the 
difficulties in determining exactly the current position in a 
cycle. Goodhart’s expectation is that the Basel Committee 
would  then  leave  this  to  the  discretion  of  the  central 
banks,  which  would  mean  that  they  would  have  to  take 
very unpopular measures at the height of a boom. Finally, 
Goodhart  spoke  about  the  non-risk-based  leverage  ratio, 
introduced in Basel III. As we cannot measure risk properly, 
a risk weighted asset approach will always be fallible und 
subject to gaming, said Goodhart. The proposed leverage of 
33:1 seems a lot in Goodhart’s opinion. He would prefer to 
see some discretion by the central banks when applying this 
ratio.
To  conclude,  Goodhart  said  that  the  current  Basel  III 
proposals focus too strongly on banks. The problems that 
need to be addressed do not only concern banks but also 
apply to other financial institutions. Therefore, these tight 
restrictions should be introduced for all. Basel III is in many 
respects a move in the right direction but, in his opinion, 
does not go far enough in certain respects. “It is better than 
I feared but not quite as good as I would have hoped”, he 
concluded.
Lut De Moor (CFS)
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OTHER LECTURES IN 2010
10 November 2010
“Supervision of International Financial Markets” 
José Viñals (International Monetary Fund)
23 November 2010
“Bewältigung der Finanzkrise: Beobachtungen und erste 
Schlussfolgerungen” 
Axel Wieandt (Deutsche Bank AG)
8 December 2010
“Rebuilding the financial system” 
Nout Wellink (President of De Nederlandsche Bank)14
The  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision3  reached 
an  agreement  on  a  new  set  of  capital  adequacy  standards, 
known as Basel III, which were presented to the Seoul G20 
Leaders summit in November. The objective of the reform 
is to achieve a safer global financial system and to stabilize 
the world economy. The Basel Committee argued that there 
should  be  a  transition  period  for  implementing  the  new 
standards. In this way, it will be ensured that the banking 
sector has a reasonable adjustment period to the higher capital 
requirements.
Under  the  agreement  reached,  the  minimum  requirement 
for common equity is raised from 2% to 4.5%. This will be 
phased in by 1 January 2015. Furthermore, the banks will 
be required to hold a capital conservation buffer above the 
regulatory minimum requirement of 2.5% to be met with 
common equity, in order to ensure a buffer that can absorb 
losses during periods of financial distress. In sum, the total 
common equity requirements will add up to 7%. In addition, 
a  countercyclical  buffer  within  a  range  of  0%  -  2.5%  of 
common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital will be 
introduced according to national circumstances. The purpose 
of this buffer is to protect the banking sector from periods of 
excess credit growth resulting from a system wide build up 
of risk. 
These  requirements  are  supplemented  by  a  non-risk-based 
leverage ratios. The minimum Tier I leverage ratio is currently 
set at 3% till the beginning of 2017. The Committee has also 
agreed to introduce new liquidity requirements, something 
that  has  been  largely  ignored  in  the  past.  The  liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
will be phased in over the next years.
An  overview  of  the  requirements  and  the  transitional 
arrangements can be found in the table below.
Basel III
3   The Basel Committee is a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters that is composed of representatives from a number of industrialized countries. Its oversight body is comprised of central 
bank governors and heads of supervision from the member countries. The so-called Basel Accords are not formal treaties and the members are requested to translate the rules into national law.
Phase-in arrangements (shading indicates transition periods), (all dates are as of 1 January)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
As of 
January
2019
Leverage Ratio Supervisory 
monitoring
Parallel run 
1 Jan 2013 -1 Jan 2017
Disclosure starts 1 Jan 2015
Migration to 
Pillar 1
Minimum Common Equity Capital Ratio  3,5 % 4,0 % 4,5 % 4,5 % 4,5 % 4,5 % 4,5 %
Capital Conservation Buffer 0,625 % 1,25 % 1,875 % 2,50 %
Minimum common equity plus capital conservation buffer 3,5 % 4,0 % 4,5 % 5,125 % 5,75 % 6,375 % 7,0 %
Phase-in of deductions from CET 1 (including amounts 
exceeding the limit for DTAs, MSRs and financials) 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 % 100 %
Minimum Tier 1 Capital 4,5 % 5,5 % 6,0 % 6,0 % 6,0 % 6,0 % 6,0 %
Minimum Total Capital 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0% 8,0 % 8,0 %
Minimum Total Capital plus conservation buffer 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,625 % 9,25 % 9,875 % 10,5 %
Capital instruments that no longer qualify as non-core Tier 1 
capital or Tier 2 capital
Phased out over 10 year horizon beginning 2013
Liquidity coverage ratio Observation 
period begins
Introduce 
minimum 
standard
Net stable funding ratio Observation 
period begins
Introduce 
minimum 
standard
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
w
w
w
.
b
i
s
.
o
r
g
Events | CFS Colloquium15
Zentralisierung – wie man Europa den Bürgern entfremdet  
Centralization – alienating Europe from its citizens 
23 June 2010 
Prof. Dr. Roman Herzog, Bundespräsident a.D
CFS Presidential Lectures
In  the  lecture  series  on  European  Integration,  the  Center  for  Financial  Studies  welcomed  former  Federal 
President Roman Herzog. Herzog spoke about the distance that has grown between the EU authorities and 
Europe’s citizens with a view to analyzing the underlying causes of this alienation.
Roman Herzog, Otmar Issing
It  is  with  pride  that  CFS  President  Otmar  Issing  can  look  back  at  two  very  successful  highlights  in  the 
Presidential Lectures Series this year. The two lectures in 2010, both held by former judges at the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, were fully booked. This proves that the lectures series has gained a strong 
foothold in Frankfurt and that the topic of European Integration is still a matter of great public importance.
Herzog began by putting this issue in its historical context. After 
the end of World War II, it became obvious that the future 
world order would be determined by states with a certain critical 
mass and political weight. To the extent that many nations were 
becoming politically organized and gaining influence, it would 
seem that the world had become a bigger place; in another sense, 
however, the possibilities arising from new means of transport 
and  information  exchange  meant  that  the  world  became  a 
smaller  place.  In  Europe  the  perceived  need  for  a  common 
approach to dealing with the challenges ahead led in 1958 to 
the creation of the European Economic Community. The start 
of this integration process derived not only from an “internal” 
European desire to develop a system for solving conflicts without 
resorting to past practices based primarily on warfare. Rather it 
also allowed Germany to reenter the international arena after the 
war, whilst providing the other EEC countries with the means 
to counter too strong a German position in Europe. At the 
same time it also suggested a way for Europe to raise its profile 
vis-à-vis the new big entities in a global world.
However,  the  consequences  of  European  integration  for  the 
day-to-day life of its citizens cannot be ignored. The decisions 
taken by the new organizational bodies – from the EEC and 
EC to the EU – have covered an ever-increasing territory and, 
at  the  same  time,  these  authorities  seem  to  have  lost  touch 
with the citizens they purport to represent. Uniform policies 
applied to a very large territory have inevitably led to a rule of 
law that entails vague legal terms, thus making compliance in 
a heterogeneous Europe difficult. Herzog gave some examples 
where  the  implementation  of  a  uniform  law  has  been  hard 
to achieve or even envision. The remoteness of the decision-
makers and the highly differentiated, complex circumstances in 
Europe have tended to leave a vacuum where there could be a 
meaningful alternative at the municipal or private sector level. 
Herzog is very much in favor of allowing competition and private 
initiative and also regional self-government to fill this vacuum. 
The advantages to this approach are to be found in the proximity 
to the people it affects and the potential flexibility it allows; an 
argument against it is that it leads potentially to an inequality in 
living conditions.
The perception that the EU authorities are far removed from 
everyday problems has not improved their standing with EU 
citizens. According to Herzog, this remoteness has led to an 
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abundance of legislation, with the consequence that all practical 
issues and problems are fed into a legal system. Many of these 
matters could, however, be solved with plain common sense. 
Herzog emphasizes that the EU should use directives rather than 
regulation, so that the adaption of the national laws is left to the 
discretion of Member States. Each Member State has its own 
national and local characteristics and is in a better position to 
decide how to implement and enforce a directive. 
This  is  one  of  the  issues  that  Europe  is  currently  facing  in 
the  upcoming  debate  concerning  budget  deficits  following 
the  financial  crisis.  Herzog  recognizes  that  the  EU  must  set 
guidelines to reduce the deficits, but this sensitive issue has to 
be handled carefully since it concerns the budget sovereignty of 
single countries and parliaments. 
The German Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment on 
the Lisbon Treaty has handed down a very strong statement, 
namely that, if need be, certain norms coming from Brussels 
can  be  declared  non-applicable4.  According  to  Herzog,  the 
Constitutional  Court  hereby  gave  a  brilliant  justification,  in 
that it referred to a decision of the European Court of Justice 
to substantiate its own decision. There are, however, few cases 
where  such  constitutional  conflicts  between  both  courts  are 
conceivable, as the EU law is mainly binding for EU institutions. 
Herzog sees further potential conflict with respect to the media 
and freedom of speech. Whilst media activities are regarded as 
services from the EU point of view, the German Constitutional 
Court also considers them a warrant for freedom of speech and 
thus democracy. In the discussion of EU law versus national law, 
Herzog emphasizes that it is not a matter of superiority, but 
rather a matter of who will follow whom according to the issues 
involved. He is convinced that sensible solutions can always be 
found, at least when both opponents remain reasonable.
In  order  to  avoid  a  conflict  on  parliamentary  rights  in  the 
challenge to align the national budgetary policies of Member 
States, the EU has until now used directives stipulating that a 
specific result must be obtained without dictating the means to 
achieving that result. Clearly this approach has not worked in 
the past and Herzog, therefore, emphasizes that Europe needs 
directives that can be effectively implemented by way of an ex 
ante decision. For this, a veto right and the certainty of knowing 
that it can be used when needed are essential tools.
Herzog went on to talk about the impact of European legislation 
on EU citizens. The European Union depends to a great extent 
on the loyalty of the people vis-à-vis such new regulations. The 
truth is that most EU citizens do not identify with Europe and 
that decisions are not conveyed effectively to those concerned. 
There is a lack of European “publicness”, owing to a number of 
facts: well-known faces are missing in Brussels, the legal system 
is inscrutable to most citizens, and the media does not play 
along. In reality, Herzog said, Europe is largely dependent on 
visible competence. This can only be reached by years of strong 
performance but too little has been done in this respect. In his 
conclusion, Herzog expressed his vision for a future Europe that 
makes more cautious use of EU regulations, offers more freedom 
for economic and regional self-regulation, and makes greater 
efforts towards achieving a better understanding of, and easier 
access to, EU law for its citizens.
Simeona Staneva and Lut De Moor (CFS)
4   http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html
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CFS-LEMF Summer School 2010
The Summer School on “Law and Economics of Contracts” 
was  the  first  event  to  be  jointly  organized  by  CFS  and 
the Doctorate/Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics of 
Money  and  Finance  (LEMF). The  program  adopted  an 
interdisciplinary approach, analyzing legal and economic 
issues concerning contracts, under the supervision of an 
outstanding international faculty. Scott Baker is Professor of 
Law at the Washington University whose research focuses 
on  the  intersection  point  of  law,  economics,  and  game 
theory. Douglas Cumming is Associate Professor in Finance 
and Entrepreneurship at the Schulich School of Business 
and carries out research on topics such as entrepreneurial 
finance,  venture  capital,  and  exchange  regulation  and 
surveillance. 
The program evolved around three topics: legal topics, 
economic theory and financial contracting.
The first part was presented by Baker. He explained con-
tract reasoning from a legal viewpoint.  He demonstrated 
how  economic  methods  should  be  incorporated  when 
dealing with contracts. The sessions were very interactive 
and we students gained some highly valuable insights from 
the perspective of an American lawyer.
The second part of the program was taught by Baker and 
Cumming together. The students were introduced to the 
theory of the firm, the Coase theorem, and the existence 
of transaction costs. The third and final part was taught by 
Cumming and focused on financial contracting. 
Law and Economics of Contracts
16-20 August 2010
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In his opening words, Kirchhof stated that “political will and 
economic laws are not isolated worlds”. Indeed, the economy 
depends on the political will of those involved. Political will 
has the ability to commit to and achieve objectives if this will is 
anchored in the law. The law seeks to give a binding answer to 
challenges that are currently of interest to society. Thus, much 
depends on the requirements we lay down for our constitution. 
Kirchhof  went  on  to  address  six  specific  points  concerning 
the process of Europeanization, all of which relate to central 
concepts of Germany’s constitutional order: 1) the appeal of and 
problems encountered in the processes of Europeanization and 
globalization, 2) inferences in terms of changes in freedom, 3) 
influences on society’s freedom, 4) loss of confidence, 5) market 
failure, 6) sustainability.
The appeal of and problems encountered in the process 
of Europeanization 
The notion of a Europe with open borders and free trade and 
exchange  holds  a  strong  appeal.  However,  the  openness  of 
borders dismantles the boundaries that secure each state, said 
Kirchhof.  This  leads  to  an  increasing  number  of  safeguards 
within each state and a weakening of the force of law within 
the 27 EU Member States. Kirchhof used as example a scenario 
where, had the Maastricht rules for public debt been made legally 
binding at the time of their implementation, many problems 
in the wake of the financial crisis would have been avoided. 
Instead the erosion of the authority of law has given rise to many 
transition problems. In Germany, for example, capital income 
is subject to a flat tax rate of 25%, in line with international 
levels, whereas labor income is taxed at much higher progressive 
rates. This indicates that national legislators are no longer able 
to transmit international economic demands to their domestic 
counterparts without disruptions occurring. 
A  second  problem  in  this  process  is  the  lack  of  public 
comprehension  with  respect  to  recent  events.  In  Germany, 
the financial crisis seems to date to have been managed quite 
successfully. However, in the view of the public many legitimate 
questions  and  uncertainties  remain  regarding  the  costs  and 
long-term impact of the crisis, how it could happen in the first 
place and whether it will repeat itself. 
Kirchhof  sees  a  third  problem  in  the  trend  towards 
“anonymization”. Today’s investors focus only on returns and 
often  use  investment  funds  where  anonymity  is  a  general 
condition. Many existing financial products are fully understood 
by neither the buyer nor the seller, and society finds itself in a 
situation involving fictitious rights, based merely on probabilities 
and  (potentially  incorrect)  assumptions.  The  question  thus 
arises concerning what relationship there should be between the 
freedom of opportunities on the one hand and responsibilities 
to society on the other. According to Kirchhof, the principle 
of freedom is only sustainable when it rests on a high moral 
standard and the principle of the “reputable merchant”. Kirchhof 
Paul Kirchhof 
Bürgerliche Freiheit im Prozess der europäischen Integration
und eines weltoffenen Marktes  
Civil liberty in the process of European integration 
and global markets
13. Oktober 2010 
Professor Dr. Dres. h.c. Paul Kirchhof (University of Heidelberg) 
The next guest in the Presidential Lectures Series was Professor Paul Kirchhof. In his presentation, Kirchhof 
looked at the changes in freedom that we are experiencing as part of the process of Europeanization and 
globalization as well as the consequences it has for our basic concept of freedom.
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also put into perspective the value of quantifying reality. Using a 
number of witty examples, he showed that a significant portion 
of reality escapes the rationale of numbers. 
What does this openness to the world mean for the 
principle of freedom?
Freedom is always an offer, Kirchhof said. It is the exploration 
of the unknown based on experience and knowledge, and led by 
morality and decency. In commercial law, freedom of enterprise 
means  that  an  entrepreneur  has  the  freedom  to  operate  his 
business. This freedom still exists  for medium-sized companies, 
but has frequently been “dissolved” in the case of large companies 
into different rights, i.e. those of shareholders vis-à-vis those of 
managers. According to Kirchhof, we currently find ourselves in 
a situation of existential need, as the European Court of Justice 
interprets freedom rights as equality rights, implying that those 
entitled to freedom have the right to take part in a legal order 
that has been decided by others. In addition, the European Court 
sees the fundamental rights charter not as a limit but rather as an 
expansion (justification) to the framework of its competences. 
This change in law is dramatic, said Kirchhof. He demonstrated 
his point with examples where the European Court interferes 
in issues that are basically outside its legal competence. The 
European  Court  of  Justice  is  now  working  its  way  towards 
acquiring authority over direct taxes via such fundamental rights 
for taxpayers. Kirchhof pointed out that such dramatic changes 
are often partly the result of implementing legislation from the 
European Commission, without any involvement on the part 
of the respective legislative institutions, namely the European 
Council and Parliament.
Are  we  in  danger  of  losing  sight  of  the  basics  of 
democracy in the process of Europeanization?
Democracy cannot exist without citizens. For a democracy to 
function, its citizens need to have a sense of unity, leading to 
a set of common rules and institutions. Currently the notion 
of European citizenship does not invoke the same response as 
that of the individual citizenship of a specific country. The EU 
is a union of closely connected states, where power is ultimately 
held in the hands of the authorities in the individual states. In 
Kirchhof’s  view  fundamental  mistakes  are  now  being  made 
against the states. Since the 1960s, the general public expects 
not only “good law” but also “good money” from the state, and 
this has led to the creation of national debt and a dependence on 
financial markets. As a result, the democratic unit as decision-
making entity has been weakened. A fundamental rethinking 
is needed according to Kirchhof, with potentially far-reaching 
consequences  for  both  states  and  financial  markets.  There 
is competition among states and among legal systems. If we 
understand competition as a legitimate rationale in this context, 
we have to consider whether and how it can be used in the legal 
framework of a democratic unit.
Loss of confidence
The next issue raised by Kirchhof is the loss of confidence in 
the state. People have lost confidence in the law because of 
an inflation of legislation - according to its own figures, the 
number of new pieces of legislation issued by the EU amount 
to 8 per day. This has led to a situation where “the legislator 
doesn’t know what he is doing and the law’s addressee doesn’t 
know what he is supposed to do”. The legislator bears only a 
fictional responsibility. Our economic system, however, is built 
fundamentally on the idea of trust. We strongly rely, for example, 
on money as a generally accepted means of exchange for the 
economic functioning of our state. It is, therefore, essential that 
the economic system be consolidated in its legitimacy.
Market failure
Many see in the current financial disruptions the proof of market 
failure.  According  to  Kirchhof,  however,  there  is  no  serious 
alternative to our capitalist market system. Thus we constantly 
need to realign this system with the force of law. Common 
market  rules  must  be  upheld  and  responsibilities  should  be 
enhanced in view of the financial markets.
Sustainability
As  his  final  point,  Kirchhof  presented  his  arguments  against 
using public debt as a political and economic tool. In his view, 
the very idea of using government debt for future investments, 
or as means to stimulating the economy is fundamentally wrong. 
We need to reconsider the idea of using public debt as a way of 
financing the state budget, thus Kirchhof.
To conclude, Kirchhof said that the aim should be not only to 
make good law, but also to win people’s confidence and improve 
their understanding. This is likely to be the main challenge in 
shaping the political will and economic rules.            Lut De Moor (CFS)
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Involuntary Unemployment and the Business Cycle 
by Christiano (Northwestern University), Trabandt (ECB) and 
Walentin (Sveriges Riksbank)
Mathias Trabandt explained how to introduce the possibility 
of involuntary unemployment in a modern New Keynesian 
macroeconomic model, a so-called dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium  (DSGE)  model  of  the  economy.  Unemployed 
are  modeled  in  a  manner  that  complies  with  the  official 
U.S. definition of unemployment: they are people without 
jobs who are (i) currently making concrete efforts to find 
work and (ii) willing and able to work. In this model, people 
searching for jobs are better off if they find a job than if they 
do not. Thus, their unemployment is ‘involuntary’. Using this 
model, the authors can account quite well for the dynamic 
response of the labor force, unemployment, GDP and other 
key  macroeconomic  variables  to  monetary  policy  surprises 
and  unexpected  technological  innovations.  The  paper  was 
discussed by Ester Faia (Goethe University) and Frank Smets 
(ECB). 
Macro-Economic Imbalances and Financial Fragility 
by Boissay (ECB)
The global financial crisis exposed the potential macroeconomic 
impact of a fragile financial system most dramatically. In his 
presentation,  Boissay  developed  an  equilibrium  model  to 
analyze  the  link  between  liquidity  and  financial  fragility. 
Financial fragility is defined as the co-existence of two self-
fulfilling  expectations  equilibria  in  the  wholesale  financial 
market. The “good time” equilibrium is characterized by high 
leverage, large balance sheets, and high credit risk taking in 
the banking sector. The “crisis time” equilibrium is associated 
with deleveraging, the collapse in trade, and liquidity hoarding. 
2nd Bundesbank-CFS-ECB Workshop on Macro and Finance 
8 October 2010 
House of Finance
Joint Lunchtime Seminars
The 2nd Bundesbank-CFS-ECB Workshop on Macro and Finance took place in October 2010. As in the previous 
year, the aim of the workshop was to provide a platform for researchers from the three institutions to present 
and discuss their current research on topics related to macroeconomics and finance. The workshop program 
included six papers, each paper with at least one discussant from one of the other institutions and sufficient time 
for a general discussion. The organizers included Mathias Hoffmann (Deutsche Bundesbank), Bartosz Maćkowiak 
(ECB) and Thomas Laubach (Goethe University Frankfurt), who also manage the weekly Joint Lunchtime Seminar 
series. Ca. 90 participants from the three institutions discussed the following research contributions: 
The  Joint  Lunchtime  Seminars  are  weekly  lectures  jointly  organized  by  three  institutions  (CFS,  Deutsche 
Bundesbank and ECB). The speakers present their current research findings to a selected circle of central bankers 
and macroeconomists. An overview of the seminars that took place in 2010 and a preview on upcoming events can 
be found on the CFS website. 
For further information please contact Celia Wieland: cwieland@ifk-cfs.de or jls@ifk-cfs.de
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Boissay finds that the wholesale financial market only becomes 
fragile when the available liquidity exceeds a certain threshold. 
This threshold depends on the productivity of the real sector 
of the economy. Thus, the economy is shown to have a limited 
liquidity  absorption  capacity.  Boissay  also  investigates  the 
consequences  of  regulatory  capital  requirements.  He  finds 
that they can reduce risk taking (at the bank level) in good 
times but cannot completely rule out the financial fragility on 
the macro-economic level. Boissay’s paper was discussed by 
Frank Heid (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Vladimir Vladimirov 
(Goethe University).
Asset Prices and Business Cycles 
with Financial Frictions
by Nezafat (University of Minnesota) and Slavík (Goethe University)
Ctirad Slavik reminded the audience that existing dynamic 
general equilibrium models have not been fully successful at 
explaining the high volatility of asset prices observed in the 
data. He presented a general equilibrium model that performs 
better in this dimension. It includes firms that differ from each 
other, in particular in each period only a fraction of firms can 
start new projects. Furthermore, these projects cannot be fully 
financed externally due to a financial constraint. The impact 
of this constraint varies over time and induces fluctuations 
in equity supply and equity prices. The model can match a 
number of key characteristics of the U.S. economy, including 
the aggregate volatility in the stock market. The paper was 
discussed by Almira Buzaushina (Deutsche Bundesbank) and 
Juha Kilponen (ECB). 
The Changing International Transmission 
of Financial Shocks: Evidence from a Classical 
Time-Varying FAVAR 
by Eickmeier and Lemke (both Deutsche Bundesbank) 
and Marcellino (EUI Florence) 
As the global financial crisis started in the financial sector in 
the United States, Eickmeier showed how to use up-to-date 
econometric time series methods to investigate the changing 
international  transmission  of  U.S.  financial  shocks.  These 
methods  termed  time-varying  factor-augmented  vector-
autoregression  models  (TV-FAVAR)  are  employed  by  the 
authors of this study to compute a financial conditions index 
(FCI)  for  the  United  States.  Unexpected  changes  in  this 
index are then considered financial shocks. Expectations are 
computed  using  a  large  set  of  macro-economic,  financial 
and trade variables for nine major advanced countries. The 
authors found that U.S. financial shocks have a considerable 
impact on growth in these nine countries. The transmission 
to  GDP  growth  in  the  euro-area  countries  and  in  Japan 
has  increased  gradually  since  the  1980s,  consistent  with 
financial globalization. A more marked increase is detected 
in the early 1980s in the U.S. itself and the U.K., consistent 
with  structural  changes  in  financial  markets  or  changes  in 
the  conduct  of  monetary  policy.  The  paper  was  discussed 
by  Pooyan  Amir  Ahmadi  (Goethe  University)  and  Marcel 
Fratzscher (ECB). 
Trusting the Bankers: A New Look at the Credit 
Channel of Monetary Policy
by Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Alcalde (all ECB)
Matteo Ciccarelli pointed out the difficulty faced by central 
banks in assessing the impact of their policy actions on credit 
market  conditions.  Credit  supply  and  demand  are  mostly 
unobserved, thus identifying completely the so-called credit 
channel  of  monetary  policy  is  not  feasible.  Bank  lending 
surveys by central banks, however, contain reliable quarterly 
information that is relevant to the quantity and quality of credit 
supply and demand. Using surveys from the United States and 
the euro area, the authors are able to obtain new empirical 
evidence  regarding  the  likely  role  of  this  credit  channel. 
In  particular,  they  find  that  the  credit  channel  amplifies  a 
monetary policy shock on GDP and inflation, through the 
balance-sheets of households, firms and banks. With regard to 
the financial crisis, they provide evidence of a credit crunch 
for firms and tighter standards for mortgages as a source of the 
reduction in GDP.  Florian Kajuth (Deutsche Bundesbank) and 
Marcel Bluhm (Goethe University) served as discussants.
Public Debt and Inflation Incentives 
by Krause and Moyen (both Deutsche Bundesbank)
In  the  last  session  of  the  conference,  Krause  presented  a 
macroeconomic  (DSGE)  model  that  includes  a  maturity 
structure for government debt. With this model he analyzed 
the incentives of a government to reduce its real debt burden 
by increasing inflation temporarily – a fitting topic in light of 
recent fears expressed by some investors in government bond 
markets. The authors find that the success of such a policy 
depends on the maturity structure of public debt and on the 
extent to which a central bank can use the credibility of its 
inflation target to exploit expectations of low inflation. In 
particular, he showed that the maturity of U.S. debt is not high 
enough so that a short-term increase in inflation that would 
be in line with a credible inflation target has much impact on 
the government’s real debt burden. To reduce the real debt 
burden it would have to raise the inflation target. Discussants 
were Mu-Chun Wang from Goethe University and Leo von 
Thadden from the ECB.
               Celia Wieland (CFS & wieland EconConsult)
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2nd International Conference: 
The Industrial Organization of Securities Markets:
Competition, Liquidity and Network Externalities  
28-29 June 2010 
Frankfurt
CFS Conferences
After  a  short  welcome  address  delivered  by  Martin  Reck, 
Managing Director and Head of Group Strategy at Deutsche 
Börse, the first presentation was given by Uwe Walz (Goethe 
University).  He  presented  a  theoretical  model  that  analyzes 
both horizontal integration and vertical integration along the 
value chain of securities trading (trading, clearing, settlement). 
The  main  results  are  that,  first,  international  integration  of 
exchanges may reduce the incentives for vertical integration and 
that, second, larger security providers have more incentives to 
integrate vertically. 
Several exchanges and multilateral trading facilities have recently 
introduced  a  fee  structure  which  charges  a  fee  to  traders 
submitting immediately executable orders (“take liquidity fee”) 
but pays a subsidy to traders submitting orders which supply 
liquidity to the market (negative “make liquidity fee”). In his 
presentation,  Thierry  Foucault  (Groupe  HEC)  provided  a 
theoretical analysis of the economics underlying these maker/
taker fee structures. The results indicate that the fee structure has 
important implications for traders’ order submission strategies. 
These effects can be counterintuitive (e.g., a higher fee has an 
ambiguous effect on welfare). Further, the total size of the fee 
(i.e., the sum of the “make” and the “take” fee) matters more than 
the split between the two components. 
During the financial crisis we have experienced that markets can 
break down because of severe informational asymmetries. The 
third presentation, delivered by Thorsten Koeppl (Queens 
University) analyzes the important question how a large player 
(e.g. a central bank) can intervene to restore trading after a 
breakdown. The results indicate that, if the market is sufficiently 
important (relative to the costs of the intervention), it is best 
to intervene immediately. A credible announcement of such a 
policy may assure market continuity, i.e., it may prevent markets 
from breaking down in the first place. 
In recent years competition between market places for order 
flow has intensified and the MiFID has certainly contributed to 
this trend. Rian Riordan (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology) 
presented an empirical analysis of the competition between the 
London Stock Exchange and several Multilateral Trading Facilities 
(MTFs). The results indicate that many investors are monitoring 
Two years ago, in 2008, the first conference on the Industrial Organization of Securities Markets took place (see 
CFS Newsletter 2/08 for details). Since then significant changes in the market environment have occurred. We 
have experienced the financial crisis, important regulatory changes and increased competition among different 
trading venues. The aim of the second conference was to reassess all aspects of the industrial organization of 
securities markets against the background of these recent developments. The conference was co-organized by 
Deutsche Börse AG, the E-Finance Lab and the Center for Financial Studies and held on the premises of Deutsche 
Börse. The audience was a stimulating mix of academics and practitioners. 
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the lowest transaction costs. In general, the LSE is the most liquid 
market, and trades on the LSE carry the most information. The 
overall finding is that the market is in general quite efficient, 
despite of the fragmentation of order flow brought about by 
the co-existence of several trading venues. In his presentation 
Bartholomäus Ende (Goethe University) covered a closely 
related topic. He analyzed whether trade-throughs happen in the 
market for Eurostoxx 50 stocks. A trade-through is a trade that 
occurred in one market at a point in time at which the same trade 
could have been executed at a different market at a lower total 
cost. The problem in identifying trade-throughs is the proper 
inclusion of trading fees into the cost estimates. The authors of 
the paper go a long way in integrating the differing fee structures 
of the market places under investigation into their estimates. 
They conclude that the fraction of trade-throughs is economically 
significant.
The  next  session  contained  two  papers  which  analyze  the 
relation between competition and regulation. Cecilia Caglio 
(U.S.  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission)  models  the  co-
existence  between  two  self-regulatory  organizations  (SROs). 
These compete for order flow by a) setting trading fees and 
b)  supervising  the  trading  activity  in  their  market.  It  turns 
out  that  competition  reduces  trading  fees  but,  at  the  same 
time, reduces the quality of market supervision. Sarah Draus 
(Université Paris-Dauphine) addressed a different aspect of the 
competition between market places. In her model she analyzed 
the competition between a regulated market and an alternative 
trading platform and its impact on the regulatory standards. The 
basic idea is that certain standards (e.g. listing standards) are 
set by the regulated market, and that the competitive situation 
may affect the strictness of the standards. The difference to the 
model presented by Caglio is that in her model both competing 
trading venues act as standard setters while in the model of Sarah 
Draus only the regulated market sets standards. The conventional 
wisdom is that competition leads to reduced standards. It turns 
out, however, that this is not necessarily true. A further result of 
the model is the observation that there may be cross-subsidization 
between the trading fee and the listing fee an exchange charges. 
The  academic  program  of  the  first  conference  day  ended 
with  a  special  session  by  Wolfgang  Hafner  and  Heinz 
Zimmermann  (both  University  of  Basel)  on  Vinzenz 
Bronzin‘s option pricing model. Vinzenz Bronzin was an Italian 
mathematician who taught at the Nautical Academy in Trieste. 
In 1908 he published a long forgotten book that developed an 
option pricing model and anticipated much of the Black Scholes 
model published 65 years later. In the joint presentation Heinz 
Zimmermann  first  explained  Bronzin‘s  approach  to  option 
pricing before Wolfgang Hafner put Bronzin‘s achievements into 
perspective by describing the political, economic and scientific 
background. 
The second day started with a paper on high frequency trading. 
High frequency traders, or algorithmic traders, recently have 
been accused of increasing volatility and destabilizing markets. 
These criticisms have, for example, been raised after the „flash 
crash“  in  the  U.S.  equity  markets  on  May  6,  2010.  Albert 
Menkveld (VU University of Amsterdam) presented a paper 
which takes a fresh look at the issue. The main argument here is 
that high-frequency traders are fast at processing information. 
They can thus update their quotes more quickly which makes 
them less vulnerable to adverse selection. Consequently, they 
are natural suppliers of liquidity. On the other hand, however, 
precisely because they are better informed they may also create 
adverse selection problems. Whether their total effect is positive 
or negative is thus an empirical question. Professor Menkveld 
therefore went on to present empirical evidence from the Dutch 
and Belgian stock market. The results support the conclusion that 
high frequency traders acting as middlemen may actually improve 
liquidity, a finding which contrasts with the conventional wisdom 
that high frequency trading is detrimental to market quality. 
Central counterparties (CCPs) are a type of institution which 
received a lot of attention recently. They are commonly used 
on organized derivatives exchanges, but much less frequently in 
OTC markets. However, there is a recent movement towards 
also  using  CCP  clearing  for  OTC  derivatives  trading.  Cyril 
Monnet (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) presented a 
theoretical model of CCPs. The model shows that CCPs can 
actually improve welfare. It also shows, however, that the CCPs 
in  OTC  markets  (on  which  non-standardized  contracts  are 
traded) have a different function than those in futures markets 
(on which standardized contracts are traded). 
As already noted, the competition between trading platforms 
has increased significantly in recent years, and the traditional 
exchanges have lost market shares to multilateral trading facilities 
(MTFs),  partly  because  the  latter  charge  lower  fees.  Peter 
Hoffmann (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) presented a theoretical 
and empirical contribution to this topic. In his model he analyzed 
trading in two markets in the presence of asymmetric information. 
One market is accessible to everyone while the other is only 
accessible to a subset of traders. The trader population in both 
markets is assumed to be different, with traders in the alternative 
market being, on average, better informed. The model shows that 
traders in this environment face a trade-off. If they trade in the 
alternative market they economize on fees but, at the same time, 
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the market share of the alternative trading system is inversely 
related  to  measures  of  adverse  selection  risk. The  empirical 
evidence, obtained from analyzing the trading of German and 
French stocks on their home markets and on Chi-X, is consistent 
with the model predictions. 
The  theoretical  market  microstructure  literature  knows  the 
concept of inventory management for at least 30 years. The idea 
is that market intermediaries such as the NYSE specialists don’t 
like to hold positions in risky assets which deviate from their 
desired inventory level. They therefore adjust their quoted prices 
in a way which helps them to restore their desired inventory 
position. The empirical literature, however, was unable to find 
consistent evidence of inventory management, partly because 
reliable data on inventories was unavailable. Albert Menkveld 
presented an empirical analysis which relies on a new and very 
detailed data set. He was able to identify strong inventory effects. 
A 100,000 $ inventory shock causes a price pressure of 0.28%. 
This price pressure causes prices to deviate from fundamental 
value, and it increases volatility. This, in turn, is associated with a 
social cost which is quantified at 0.35 basis points. 
The paper presented by Harald Hau (INSEAD) deals with 
a dual market structure in the bond market. The market has a 
dealer segment and a customer segment. The primary question 
addressed in the paper is the quality of the customer segment 
of the market. The empirical results show that the quality of the 
customer segment is surprisingly high (which is in contrast to 
results obtained for the U.S.) but also shows high dispersion. 
The relative quality of the customer segment improves in times 
of high volatility and adverse selection risk. The paper develops 
a model that is consistent with these stylized facts. The model 
assumes that dealers face inventory constraints and therefore 
may  have  to  lay  off  inventory  in  the  dealer  segment  of  the 
market. Dealers‘ inventory considerations are also an important 
determinant of spreads in the customer segment of the market. 
Bidisha  Chakrabarty  (St.  Louis  University)  presented  a 
paper which deals with the behavioral foundations of market 
making. Attention is a scarce resource. A specialist who trades 
several stocks cannot devote full attention to all of them. Thus, 
when  one  stock  deserves  particular  attention  (for  example 
because  of  an  earnings  announcement)  the  dealer  has  to 
neglect other stocks. Consistent with this idea it is found that 
the liquidity of other stocks declines when one of the stocks 
in the dealer’s portfolio has an earnings announcement. The 
paper then discusses the role of market design in alleviating 
the attention constraints. The basic idea is that a relaxation 
of attention constraints may ultimately increase liquidity and 
market quality. 
Most  papers  in  the  microstructure  literature  either  focus  on 
trading or on post-trading (clearing and settlement). The paper 
presented by Hans Degryse (Tilburg University) combines these 
two issues and thus considers the whole value chain. Specifically, 
the paper theoretically analyzes how the pricing structure of the 
clearing and settlement agent affects market liquidity. The basic 
idea of the model is that internalized settlement (both buyer and 
seller are customers of the same broker) is associated with lower 
costs. In this setting it becomes important whether settlement fees 
are the same for all trades, are broker-specific (i.e., customers of 
large brokers are charged less than customers of small brokers) or 
trade-specific (i.e. trades settled internally are charged less than 
those settled externally). In the last case, liquidity suppliers have 
a competitive advantage in supplying liquidity to other traders 
who are customers of the same brokerage firm. Depending on 
model parameters, these liquidity suppliers set spreads such as 
to target only customers of their own brokers or all customers. 
Obviously, customers of the large broker have a larger chance of 
meeting a customer of the same broker. Thus, the strategies of the 
customers and small and large brokers may differ. The interplay of 
these two mechanisms results in a relation between the structure 
of settlement fees and market liquidity. 
Last but not least, Olga Lewandowska (Goethe University) 
and Bernd Mack (Deutsche Börse) presented a paper on clearing 
arrangements in over-the-counter markets. The starting point of 
their analysis was the current regulatory pressure in favor of 
establishing a central counterparty in OTC markets. An obvious 
question to ask in this context is whether a central counterparty 
would  really  work  better  than  the  risk  sharing  mechanisms 
currently in place. They developed an analytical framework that 
allows to analyze the netting efficiency of alternative risk sharing 
mechanisms.  This framework can be used in simulation studies 
aimed at comparing the efficiency of the various mechanisms. 
The stimulating discussions during the conference as well as the 
positive feedback received after the conference provide reliable 
evidence of a successful event. We therefore plan to organize 
the third conference on the Industrial Organization of Securities 
Markets in 2012.
Erik Theissen (University of Mannheim and CFS)
    Please note: All papers presented at the conference 
are available for download on the CFS web site under 
www.ifk-cfs.de/index.php?id=1722
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The ECB and Its Watchers XII 
9 July 2010 
Frankfurt am Main
At the 2009 ECB watchers conference 
many  commentators  said  the  ECB  had 
had  a  “good  financial  crisis”.  It  had 
performed  quite  well  relative  to  other 
central  banks  in  terms  of  managing 
money market and bank liquidity, helping 
Euro area governments to organize bank 
rescues, and fighting the great recession 
with  interest  rate  cuts  and  a  range  of 
unconventional  measures,  in  particular 
its long-term repo operations and some 
direct  asset  purchases.  Together  with 
President  Trichet  in  September  2009, 
ECB watchers felt that the timing was 
right  to  present  an  appropriate  exit 
strategy  from  these  extraordinary 
monetary measures. 
The euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010 
proved  this  assessment  too  optimistic. 
Of course, the question of government 
bailouts  and  fiscal  sustainability  had 
already featured very prominently on the 
2009  conference  agenda,  for  example, 
when  ECB  Board  Member  Gonzalez-
Paramo declared “if confidence in future 
stability  is  to  be  ensured,  now  is  the 
time  to  set  out  an  effective  fiscal  exit 
strategy.”
Unfortunately,  this  warning  came  too 
late. By the date of the 2010 conference 
some of the worst fears of fiscal stability 
pessimists had been realized. Within a 
short  period  of  time,  euro  area  policy 
makers  decided  that  the  “no  bailout” 
regime would have to be replaced with 
mutual guarantees. The IMF was called 
in for support, and the ECB surprised 
many of its watchers by starting direct 
purchases of euro area government bonds. 
Contrary to earlier policy responses to the 
financial crisis, these measures proved to 
be highly controversial. Some supporters 
have judged them indispensable for the 
continued survival of the euro zone as a 
monetary union, while some opponents 
have considered the policies themselves 
to sow the seeds of continued euro area 
crises.
In his 2010 address to the ECB watchers, 
President Jean-Claude Trichet (ECB) 
emphasized that governments must send 
a clear message to markets – a message 
of  determination  and  commitment  to 
sound  macroeconomic  policies.  Just 
like  consumers,  governments  cannot 
live  beyond  their  means  forever.  He 
reviewed  Europe’s  governments’ 
commitment  to  pursue  fiscal  conso-
lidation  and  defended  the  role  of  the 
ECB’s government securities purchases. 
Looking forward, he outlined three areas 
for  reform:  (i)  national  fiscal  reforms 
that  should  aim  at  creating  an  anchor 
and  a  collective  guarantee  in  stronger 
institutions  for  budget  surveillance, 
(ii)  a  more  stringent  implementation 
of  euro  area  rules  and  procedures  to 
check and correct excessive deficits and 
debts  with  greater  automaticity,  and 
(iii)  a  crisis  management  framework 
that  respects  strict  conditionality 
and  minimizes  moral  hazard. 
In  the  first  debating  session  of  the 
conference,  Lorenzo  Bini-Smaghi 
from  the  ECB  exchanged  views  with 
Charles  Wyplosz  (Graduate  Institute 
Geneva)  and  Manfred  Neumann 
(University of Bonn) on the appropriate 
strategies for dealing with macroeconomic 
imbalances in the euro area. The need 
for strategies to increase competitiveness 
in  deficit  countries  was  apparent.  To 
this end, wages in those countries with 
current  account  deficits  would  need 
to increase by less than productivity in 
the  future.  Surplus  countries  such  as 
Germany, of course, should not act to 
lose trade competitiveness. They could, 
however,  further  liberalize  the  service 
sector to help boost domestic growth. 
ECB  Board  Member  Jürgen  Stark 
presented the ECB’s enhanced monetary 
analysis  and  reviewed  lessons  learnt 
in  the  financial  crisis  regarding  the 
appropriate  role  of  money  and  credit 
in monetary policy. He concluded that 
growth excesses in money and credit such 
as  those  observed  before  the  financial 
crisis, should be headed off by monetary 
policy rather than left alone. His debating 
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partner,  Charles  Goodhart  (London 
School of Economics) then asked for a 
symmetric policy response to the drastic 
slowdown in M3 growth more recently. 
The  afternoon  program  started  off 
with  a  more  informal,  talk-show  style 
conversation  with  experienced  policy 
makers from major emerging economies, 
Rakesh  Mohan  (former  Deputy 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of India) 
and  Eduardo  Loyo  (former  Deputy 
Governor of the Central Bank of Brazil), 
moderated by Volker Wieland. They 
shared  their  view  of  their  countries’ 
experience during the financial crisis as 
well as policy challenges and successes. 
It  was  followed  by  a  debate  between 
John Lipsky (First Deputy Managing 
Director, International Monetary Fund) 
and  Anil  Kashyap  from  the  University 
of  Chicago,  on  the  question  whether 
the  new  supervisory  and  regulatory 
architecture  would  provide  adequate 
protection  from  systemic  risk.  Lipsky 
presented a novel resolution framework 
developed  at  the  IMF  that  could  help 
to  deal  with  cross-border  failures. 
Kashyap  reviewed  the  new  institutions 
and  regulations  developed  in  Europe 
and  the  United  States  and  expressed 
his skepticism whether these structures 
were  sufficiently  well-designed  to  deal 
with  the  threat  of  moral  hazard  and 
systemic risk in a satisfactory manner. 
In  conclusion  of  the  conference,  Vítor 
Constâncio, who had been appointed as 
Vice-President of the European Central 
Bank on July 1st, presented his assessment 
of the future of euro area governance and 
the  strategy  for  maintaining  financial 
stability to ECB watchers.
 Volker Wieland (Goethe University and CFS)
European Finance Association · 37th Annual Meeting
25-28 August 2010 
Frankfurt am Main
This year’s annual meeting of the European Finance Association was held in Frankfurt at Campus Westend. 
A special highlight of the conference was 
the  keynote  lecture  given  by  Douglas 
Diamond from the University of Chicago. 
His  speech  focused  on  short-term  debt 
as  the  main  reason  for  financial  crises 
observed  in  history.  He  concluded  that 
regulation  should  limit  excessive  use  of 
short-term debt for refinancing purposes, 
and  that  it  should  apply  to  all  financial 
institutions, rather than just to banks. 
Part  of  the  program  contributed  to 
contemporary policy debates. Three Policy 
Panels were devoted to an open discussion 
on highly relevant policy issues. The panel 
on Bank Resolution discussed alternative 
ways  to  address  the  problem  of  moral 
hazard in banking, and how to re-introduce 
restructuring  as  a  viable  option  for 
systemically important banks. The panel on 
the Future of Financial Regulation covered 
the challenges that regulatory authorities 
face in their efforts to redesign rules for 
financial institutions and markets. Finally, 
the panel on Transaction Taxes and Short-
Selling Restrictions focused on scientific 
evidence  regarding  the  consequences  of 
such measures for market efficiency, and 
discussed their repercussions for financial 
stability in general.
This  event  has  come  to  be  the  leading 
academic  conference  on  finance-related 
topics in Europe with attendants from all 
over the world. Conference participants 
agreed  that  the  2010  EFA  meeting  in 
Frankfurt  was  an  outstanding  success 
marked  by  an  excellent,  high-level 
academic turnout. 
During the event Jan Krahnen was elected 
as  the  next  President  of  the  European 
Finance  Association.  He  is  currently 
Vice-President of the association and will 
replace  Kristian  Miltersen  (Copenhagen 
Business School) as of January 1st, 2011.
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CFS Conference on Household Finance 
23-24 September 2010 
Athens, Greece
The  academic  program  of  the 
conference  was  opened  by  Christian 
Gollier (University of Toulouse) with 
a  presentation  on  the  implications  of 
flexibility  for  agents’  optimal  decision 
making under risk. The general finding 
in theoretical literature is that flexibility, 
defined as the ability of decision makers 
to adapt ex post to the state of nature, 
raises expected utility and enhances risk 
tolerance. However, Gollier showed that 
these conclusions only hold in specific 
classes  of  models.  In  addition,  he 
presented a set of sufficient conditions 
(additional  restrictions  on  preferences 
and  characteristics  of  the  available  ex 
post adjustments) which imply that the 
optimal  risk  exposure  is  larger  in  a 
flexible context.
The second talk was given by Olympia 
Bover (Bank of Spain). She presented 
results from an empirical study of the 
determinants  of  house  purchases  and 
housing wealth for the case of Spanish 
households, using a panel sample from 
the  first  two  waves  of  the  Spanish 
Survey  of  Household  Finances.  Her 
approach consists of estimating discrete 
hazard  models,  multinominal  models 
of  competing  risks  that  distinguish 
investment from consumption use, and 
models  using  transactions  data.  The 
results indicate a positive and significant 
effect of the return of housing on the 
demand for housing (both for the case of 
consumption and investment).
Also  pertaining  to  the  issue  of  the 
factors  affecting  household  housing 
demand  across  the  life  cycle,  João 
F.  Cocco  (London  Business  School) 
presented  a  paper  on  the  trade-offs 
of  Alternative  Mortgage  Products 
(AMPs). He used two decades of U.K. 
panel  data  on  labor  income,  housing 
and mortgage information in order to 
assess whether the mortgage type and 
the amounts borrowed help to predict 
future labor income, as the permanent 
income  hypothesis  would  imply.  The 
results  tend  to  confirm  the  life-cycle 
consumption smoothing hypothesis. 
The first talk of the afternoon session was 
held by Annette Vissing-Jorgenssen 
(Northwestern  University).  She 
presented  an  empirical  paper  aimed 
at  understanding  default  on  consumer 
credit. The data comprises more than 
a million purchases on credit, made at 
different  retail  stores  across  Mexico, 
with a significant portion of the loans 
not being repaid. From analyzing default 
behavior across product groups, Vissing-
Jorgenssen  concludes  that  people’s 
product choices are a strong predictor 
of their credit repayment rates, but also 
that borrowers with less self-control or 
a strong preference for indulgence seem 
to  have  an  abnormally  high  fraction 
of  luxuries  within  their  consumption. 
The  first  day  of  the  program  ended 
with a presentation by Sumit Agarwal 
(Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Chicago). 
He  presented  empirical  results  about 
the  influence  of  cognitive  abilities  on 
household  financial  decision  making. 
The authors of the paper find that higher 
cognitive  skills,  as  measured  by  test 
scores from the U.S. military, generate 
a significant increase in optimal use of a 
credit card after a balance transfer and 
a  significant  reduction  in  house  price 
estimation  mistakes  by  home  equity 
borrowers. 
The next day started with a presentation 
by  Raimond  Maurer  (Goethe 
University)  on  a  project  about  the 
implications  of  flexibility,  endogenous 
retirement  and  lifetime  payouts  on 
optimal portfolio choice over the life-
cycle.  The  results  show  that  making 
labor supply endogenous increases the 
implied work effort of the young and 
raises the older persons’ equity share. 
In order to match empirically observed 
facts  in  terms  of  hours  worked  and 
equity holdings, it is essential to properly 
account for retirement behavior in a life 
cycle context. 
Barry  Scholnick  (University  of 
Alberta) presented an empirical analysis 
of  a  new  data  set  of  monthly  credit 
card  transactions.  He  showed  that, 
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contrary to what standard consumption 
smoothing theories would predict, both 
the absolute size of income changes and 
its size relative to total income matter 
for  consumption  and  debt  holdings  at 
the individual level. 
Kasper Meisner Nielsen (Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology) 
presented a paper examining the causal 
effects of entry and participation costs 
on stockholding. The authors’ data set 
contained  unexpected  inheritances 
due to sudden deaths. The results tend 
to  be  consistent  with  the  presence  of 
fixed  participation  costs,  while  it  is 
also apparent that stock market exit is 
an  active  choice  with  the  majority  of 
individuals who inherit large positions 
of stocks selling out the entire position 
immediately.
In  the  afternoon,  Kim  Peijnenburg 
(Tilburg  University)  presented  a 
theoretical  analysis  of  optimal  con-
sumption  and  investment  decisions 
during  retirement,  when  individuals 
face  health  cost  risks.  The  authors’ 
results  substantiate  the  fact  that  the 
most important determinants of optimal 
annuity demand are medical expenses, 
wealth at retirement and the minimum 
desired consumption level. 
The academic program ended with a talk 
by  Alexander  Michaelides  (LSE) 
on  the  annuity  market  participation 
puzzle.  The  paper  shows  that  if  the 
model is calibrated with the empirical 
wealth  distribution,  annuitization  is 
compulsory, and a bequest motive exists 
under Epstein-Zin preferences, then the 
theoretical  implications  come  close  to 
the actual data in terms of the voluntary 
annuity  market  participation  and  the 
share of wealth invested in stocks. 
The  conference  ended  with  a  panel 
discussion on the Greek financial crisis, 
moderated by Michael Haliassos, that 
was attended by the Minister of Finance, 
George  Papaconstantinou,  and  the 
former  Prime  Minister,  Constantinos 
Simitis  and  received  considerable 
attention in the Greek and international 
media. The first talk was held by Lucas 
Papademos  (former  Vice  President 
of  the  ECB),  who  stressed  that  the 
deterioration  of  the  fiscal  situation  in 
most advanced economies is a legacy of 
the financial crisis, with a series of other 
factors like the increase in government 
expenditures, the loss of international 
competitiveness and the low credibility 
of fiscal statistics and government fiscal 
foresight  being  particular  sources  of 
vulnerability  for  the  Greek  economy. 
Papademos  remarked,  though,  that 
he  sees  the  measures  that  have  been 
implemented  so  far  as  significant, 
courageous and necessary in order to halt 
the negative evolution of unsustainable 
debt  dynamics  and  to  prevent  further 
losses in competitiveness. He concluded 
by  saying  that  success  is  the  only 
envisaged  outcome  of  the  economic 
adjustment programs, not only in Greece 
but in all of the euro area. 
Athanasios  Orphanides  (Central 
Bank of Cyprus) focused on the lessons 
that  can  be  drawn  from  the  Greek 
situation for the economic governance 
of the euro area. He said that the euro 
area  governments  missed  the  proper 
incentives  to  gear  domestic  policies 
towards compatibility with a common 
currency area. He also mentioned that 
during  the  (rather  stable)  last  decade 
market  forces  did  not  exert  sufficient 
discipline  on  budgetary  excesses.  In 
terms of policy measures, he mentioned 
the  advantages  of  transparency,  fiscal 
credibility  and  consistency  through  a 
multi-year  fiscal  planning  horizon 
and  a  better  coordination  among  EU 
governments. 
Gikas  Hardouvelis  (University  of 
Piraeus)  focused  on  the  implications 
of  the  crisis  on  financial  markets  and 
especially  on  the  question  of  risk 
containment,  for  example  by  drastic   
structural  reforms,  which  insure  that 
once  consumer  sentiment  stabilizes 
and private investment stops declining, 
domestic output can recover forcefully. 
Christos Gortsos (Panteion University 
of Athens) noted that the Greek banking 
system had been negatively affected by 
the Greek financial crisis but had proven 
to  be  rather  resilient  in  the  face  of 
international shocks, thanks to a strong 
capital  base  and  steadily  increasing 
provisions. He insisted that under the 
current  conditions,  the  challenges 
for  the  Greek  banking  system  are  to 
maintain adequate liquidity levels, assist 
enterprises  and  households  in  dealing 
with  the  economic  downturn,  and 
insure a smooth transition to the new 
capital and liquidity requirements.
Finally,  Costas  Meghir  (Yale 
University)  and  Dimitris  Vayanos 
(LSE) analyzed the implications of the 
financial and economic crisis in Greece 
by looking at the challenges in terms of 
competitiveness  and  growth,  market 
governance,  performance  incentives 
in  the  public  sector,  liberalization 
of  labor  markets,  social  security  and 
pension systems, public healthcare and 
education.  They  also  introduced  the 
Blog of Greek Economists for Reform 
(www.greekeconomistsforreform.org), 
a new independent platform for policy 
analysis,  discussions  and  proposals  by 
academic economists. The blog editors 
are Michael Haliassos, Dimitris Vayanos 
and Yannis Ioannides. 
The  conference  ended  with  a  speech 
by  George  Papaconstantinou,  the 
Greek  Minister  of  Finance.  He  said 
that,  in  the  wake  of  the  financial 
crisis,  Greece  had  to  cope  with  deep 
structural problems and a complete loss 
of confidence on international markets, 
such that the government faced a race 
against  time.  Tough  measures  had  to 
be  taken  to  stave  off  the  crisis.  The 
problem,  however,  is  more  structural 
and institutional and has to be addressed 
by  deep  reforms  of  the  budget  and 
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tax  systems.  He  mentioned  that  one 
can  cut  pensions  and  wages,  as  the 
Greek government has done, by 15% 
and  10%  respectively,  but  until  and 
unless are changed the rules so as to 
stop the kind of excesses seen in the 
past,  the  results  are  not  getting  the 
country very far. And after a few years 
the same problems will probably arise 
again. Finally, the Minister highlighted 
the  Greek  government’s  commitment 
to  continue  the  reform  of  the  public 
sector,  to  insure  transparency  and 
social equity. 
Cristian Badarinza (Goethe University)
ECB-CFS Research Network
“Macro-prudential Regulation as an Approach to Contain Systemic 
Risk: Economic Foundations, Diagnostic Tools and Policy Instruments”
27-28 September 2010 
Frankfurt
OPENING REMARKS
Jean-Claude Trichet (President of the European Central Bank) 
In  his  opening  remarks,  President Trichet  focused  on  the 
relationship between the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
and the ECB. The ESRB will be operational from January 2011 
on, with a mandate to identify and prioritize systemic risks 
at  the  macro-prudential  level.  It  will  issue  early  warnings 
when systemic risks arise and give policy recommendations 
in response to the risks it identifies. Although the ECB will 
provide  support  –  analytically,  statistically,  administratively 
and logistically – the ESRB will be an independent body. It 
will be hosted by the ECB via the ESRB Secretariat, having 
close ties to some of the ECB’s business areas. The ECB and the 
ESRB will cooperate intensively on developing the conceptual 
and  analytical  underpinnings  for  macro-prudential  policies. 
“Research can support us significantly and will help to meet 
the challenges of macro-prudential policy”, Trichet said and 
he pointed to the intellectual challenges that lie ahead. He 
concluded by positioning the current conference within the 
scope of a major joint research effort by the ECB and other 
central banks. 
The 13th conference of the ECB-CFS Research Network to promote research on „Capital Markets and Financial 
Integration in Europe“ took place in Frankfurt and was hosted by the European Central Bank. The complete 
conference article is available on the CFS website. Here you will find a summary of some of the speeches and 
sessions.
KEYNOTE SPEECH*
John Geneakoplos (Yale University)
The Leverage Cycle
Geneakoplos explained the “anatomy” of the leverage cycle 
and its relevance for policymakers. He noted that the interest 
rate,  as  the  most  important  variable  in  an  economy,  has 
received  far  more  attention  from  economists  and  policy 
makers  than  collateral.  However,  in  crisis  times,  the  value 
of  collateral  is  more  important  than  the  interest  rate. The 
volatility of collateral values affects leverage and thus asset 
prices, contributing to economic booms and busts. The policy 
implication of this theory on leverage is that central banks 
should control system wide leverage, limiting leverage growth 
in good times and mitigating the sharp fall in leverage in bad 
times. In this framework, leverage is defined as the ratio of 
collateral values to the down-payment that must be made to 
buy them. Geneakoplos presented some anecdotal evidence 
about booms and busts in the mortgage markets from his own 
private  sector  experiences,  which  later  became  milestones 
in his own research on the leverage cycle. Departing from 
standard economic theory, where the equilibrium interest rate 
is derived from supply-demand equations, leverage is jointly 
determined  with  the  interest  rate  in  Geneakoplos’  theory. 
The intuition behind the leverage cycle is that in good times 
margin  requirements  are  low,  leverage  goes  up  and  so  do 
asset prices. The crash is generated by “scary bad news”, news 
that increases uncertainty and disagreement about the future 
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*  OTHER KEYNOTE SPEECHES BY:
  Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell (European Central Bank), Robert Engle (NYU Stern Business School) and Anil Kashyap (University of Chicago)29
value of the collateral. This leads to a drop in asset prices, 
deleveraging through assets sales to meet margin requirements, 
further losses in asset value and tighter margin requirements. 
Geneakoplos  proposed  the  regulation  of  leverage  through 
a  loan-to-value  ratio  as  an  attempt  to  limit  the  negative 
externalities of excessive leverage on the real economy.
SESSION 2: APPLIED RESEARCH INTO THE 
SOURCES, TRANSMISSION CHANNELS AND REAL 
EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL CRISES
Erlend Nier (IMF): What Caused the Global Financial Crisis? 
Pierre Monnin (Swiss National Bank): The Impact of Banking 
Sector Stability on the Real Economy
Sujit Kapadia (Bank of England): Overview of RAMSI 
(Risk Assessment Model for Systemic Institutions)
Trying to explore the roots of the current financial crisis, Nier 
explained how abundant liquidity had contributed to the crisis 
by fuelling high leverage growth and strong reliance on the 
wholesale markets. More specifically, the main channels were 
lenient monetary policy, global imbalances and differences in 
the supervisory regime. Capital flows rather than low policy 
rates were the key drivers of increases in leverage financed 
in wholesale markets. This effect is less strong when financial 
supervision is strong. Concerning the first channel, Nier argued 
that although it seems plausible that low short-term rates may 
have provided incentives to accumulate leverage through low 
wholesale funding costs for intermediaries and low mortgage 
rates for households, the study finds that in some countries the 
higher policy rate did not slow-down the building of financial 
imbalances  in  the  financial  sector.  Nier  concluded  that  the 
results do not support the case for a reform of monetary policy 
objectives away from price stability to financial stability. Instead 
he made it clear that a larger emphasis on liquidity regulation 
is needed.
Monnin presented a study on the impact of banking sector 
stability on real output growth and inflation. A panel VAR 
is  estimated  in  which  the  output  variance  is  allowed  to 
depend on banking sector stability, avoiding the restriction 
on  the  causal  direction. As  a  measure  of  banking  sector 
stability, Monin uses a continuous index based on Merton’s 
model for credit spreads instead of a binary indicator often 
used in the literature. The results show that banking sector 
stability is indeed a driver of output growth and that this 
effect is asymmetric across stable and unstable periods. In 
contrast,  there  seems  to  be  no  relation  between  inflation 
and  banking  sector  stability.  Monin  also  stresses  another 
important result concerning the high correlation between the 
Fed GDP forecast errors and the proposed stability measure. 
He concludes that this supports the argument that central 
banks should incorporate the financial sector in their forecast 
models.
Sujit  Kapadia  introduced  the  risk  assessment  model  for 
systemic  institutions  (RAMSI)  applied  on  U.K.  banks. The 
model integrates different sources of risk to the U.K. banking 
system, accounting for non-linear systemic feedbacks, amplifiers 
and  network  dynamics. Thus,  macroeconomic  and  financial 
shocks modeled within a Bayesian VAR affect the balance sheet 
of banks resulting in a specific loss distribution at system level. 
The simulated system level distribution exhibits fat tails despite 
Gaussian shocks to the various macroeconomic factors. The 
implied effects on bank lending translate into macroeconomic 
shocks  completing  the  feedback  loop.   Another  interesting 
feature of the model is the “danger zone approach”, a score 
based  on  various  balance  sheet  items:  as  information  on  a 
particular bank deteriorates, the funding markets close to that 
institution. The model can be used for forecasting and scenario 
analysis. 
SESSION 5: INCORPORATING FINANCIAL
INSTABILITY IN AGGREGATE MODELS
Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University): 
A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector
Frederic Boissay (ECB): Liquidity and Financial Fragility
Sannikov introduced a macroeconomic model with financial 
frictions in which financial experts borrow from less productive 
agents. Persistent wealth shocks are amplified though leverage 
and  asset  pricing  feedback  effects. The  combination  of  the 
two gives rises to endogenous risk: wealth shocks results in 
a lower demand for assets and a drop in asset prices, which 
depletes  the  net  worth  of  leveraged  financial  experts  even 
further leading to fire sales and lower assets prices. Sannikov 
explained the destabilizing potential of these liquidity spirals 
and their negative externalities through fire sales and spill-over 
effects to the real economy. He also stressed another important 
implication of the model relating to securitization. Although 
risk sharing reduces the costs of idiosyncratic shocks and thus 
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In 2011, the Center for Financial Studies 
and Goethe University will award for the 
fourth time the Deutsche Bank Prize in 
Financial Economics. The prize will be 
presented  to  an  renowned  researcher, 
in  recognition  of  an  outstanding 
achievement  in  the  field  of  financial 
economic research.
From  September  till  November  2010, 
more  than  3,800  academics  from 
60  countries  had  the  opportunity  to 
take  part  in  the  nomination  process. 
Academics from top universities in the 
U.S., Europe and Latin America as well 
as the from the Asia-Pacific region were 
invited  to  submit  entries  and  propose 
nominees for the prize. In addition, staff 
members  of  central  banks,  and  many 
other institutions such as the OECD, the 
BIS and the IMF had the opportunity to 
suggest  a  candidate  as  potential  prize 
winner.
“In a short period of time, the Deutsche 
Bank Prize in Financial Economics has 
achieved an outstanding reputation. The 
number  of  participating  professors  and 
academics eligible to nominate a potential 
prize  winner  has  risen  from  roughly 
1,400  in  2005  to  more  than  3,800 
today.  This  growing  attention  proves 
that  our  academic  prize  for  financial 
economics enjoys wide recognition” said 
CFS  Director  Uwe  Walz,  who  is  the 
Chairman of the Jury. 
Members  of  the  international  Jury, 
alongside  Uwe  Walz,  include  Luigi 
Guiso  (European  University  Institute), 
Michael  Haliassos  (CFS  Director)  and 
Charles Yuji Horioka (Osaka University), 
Otmar Issing (CFS President), Jan Pieter 
Krahnen  (CFS  Director)  and  Raimond 
Maurer  (Goethe  University).  Also 
serving  as  Jury  member  are  Thomas 
Mayer (Managing Director of Deutsche 
Bank Research and Chief Economist of 
Deutsche  Bank),  Carmen  M.  Reinhart 
(Maryland  University)  and  the  winner 
of  the  Deutsche  Bank  Prize  in  2009, 
Robert J. Shiller (Yale University).  At 
this  occasion,  the  Jury  would  like  to 
thank the nominators for their input.
The  winner  of  the  award,  which 
carries  an  endowment  of  €  50,000, 
will  be  announced  in  February  2011. 
The  award  itself  will  be  presented  by 
Josef  Ackermann,  Chairman  of  the 
Management Board of Deutsche Bank, at 
a ceremony in Frankfurt on 22 September 
2011.  The  award  ceremony  will  take 
place  during  the  course  of  a  scientific 
CFS  Symposium  at  Campus  Westend 
that will focus on the research subject of 
the prize winner. 
The prize was awarded for the first time 
in 2005 to Eugene F. Fama (University of 
Chicago) for developing and researching 
the  concept  of  market  efficiency.  In 
2007  Michael  Woodford  (Columbia 
University)  received  the  prize  for  his 
research  on  the  theory  of  monetary 
macroeconomics.  In  2009  Robert  J. 
Shiller was honored for his fundamental 
contributions  to  research  in  the  field 
of  financial  economics  and,  amongst 
other  things,  his  key  contribution  to 
the understanding of price fluctuations 
on markets and to the development of 
financial  instruments  to  hedge  against 
macroeconomic risks.
Sabine Kimmel  (CFS)
Center for Financial Studies has kicked off
the nomination process for the 
“Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics 2011”
·   International Jury of experts in financial economics 
·   Some 3,800 academics from around the world were invited to propose nominees 
·   Jury has received outstanding academic submissions with practical application
·   The prize is being awarded for the fourth time and carries an endowment of € 50,000
    Email: db-prize@ifk-cfs.de 
www.db-prize-financialeconomics.org
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interest rate spreads, the agents become less financially constrained and increase 
their leverage, increasing systemic risk.
Boissay presented a model linking liquidity and financial fragility. In this framework 
financial fragility arises when aggregate liquidity exceeds the absorption capacity 
of  the  real  economy,  as  the  result  of  the  higher  growth  of  the  market-based 
banking  sector  relative  to  the  real  economy. Two  other  features  of  the  model 
capturing important aspects of the past financial turmoil relate to the loosening of 
lending standards and the sudden liquidity freeze on financial markets. When the 
available liquidity exceeds a certain threshold, the economy moves from the “good 
equilibrium” with high leverage, large balance sheets and high credit risk taking in 
the “crisis time equilibrium” in which liquidity hoarding banks de-leverage and trade 
collapses. Boissay also considered the effects of capital requirements on financial 
fragility and concluded that they do reduce risk taking behavior of the individual 
bank but are not effective as a macro-prudential tool.     Oana Maria Georgescu31
New staff members
Laura Moretti is a PostDoc Researcher with the task of establishing and managing the new CFS Data Center. 
She joined the Center for Financial Studies in October 2010. Laura earned a Ph.D. in Economics from Boston 
University, her M.Sc. from Pompeu Fabra and her Bachelor Degree from Bocconi University. Her research 
interests are Macroeconomics and International Finance, in particular she focuses on the role of transparency 
in international financial markets.
Lulu Wang joined the Center for Financial Studies as a researcher in November 2010. She is coordinating 
the CFS Visitors Program. This newly established academic exchange program seeks to stimulate research 
collaborations and dissemination of cutting-edge research techniques and findings in the five focal areas of 
research  at  CFS.  Lulu  graduated  with  a  Master  in  Finance  from  the  Albert-Ludwigs-University  Freiburg 
and became a doctoral student within the Graduate Program “Finance and Monetary Economics” at Goethe 
University in October 2007.
Senior Fellow
Lucas Papademos has accepted to become a Senior Fellow at CFS. As Senior Fellow he will be involved 
in policy oriented research issues, mainly in the areas of monetary policy and financial stability. Professor 
Papademos was the Vice-President of the European Central Bank from 2002 to 2010. Before joining the ECB, he 
was Governor of the Bank of Greece from 1994 to 2002. He completed his doctoral degree at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology under Nobel laureate Franco Modigliani, and started his academic career at Columbia 
University (USA). Papademos has published, in addition to numerous policy papers, articles in a wide range of 
academic journals, such as Economic Theory, European Economic Review and Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. He has also edited 
several books. Recently, he co-edited with Jürgen Stark a book entitled “Enhancing Monetary Analysis”. Papademos is a member 
of the Academy of Athens, Professor at the University of Athens, and currently Economic Adviser to the Greek Prime Minister. In 
the spring semester of 2011, he is scheduled to visit the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and teach courses 
on international economics and the financial crisis. 
Papademos has been an active participant in many CFS events, such as the ECB and Its Watchers conferences and the International 
Research Forum on Monetary Policy. CFS is very grateful for the opportunity to work with Lucas Papademos on policy-inspired 
research issues and on policy analysis at the highest level.
The CFS team wishes you a Happy New Year 2011
    Email: db-prize@ifk-cfs.de 
www.db-prize-financialeconomics.org
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